Bridging the gap between science and animal ethics. The morality of industrial animal farming with regards to animal welfare by Thubron, Sarah
 
 
Centre for Peace Studies 
Bridging the divide between science and 
animal ethics 
The morality of industrial animal farming with regards to animal welfare 
— 
Sarah Thubron 









Bridging the divide between science and animal ethics: 
The morality of industrial animal farming with regards 







I would like to thank my supervisor Jarle Weigård for all of the feedback and helpful 
advice. 
Thanks to Will Stock for providing the seemingly endless proof reads, for acting as a 
desperately needed social barrier and for ensuring a steady supply of tea, insults and useless 
information.  
I would also like to thank my parents for all of the chocolate and snacks that fuelled 
this thesis… 
Lastly, thanks to Richard Thubron for listening and responding in a way that reminded 




Current debates regarding animal rights and ethics tend to remain separated from the relevant 
science and scientific evidence. The aim of this thesis is to therefore help fill this gap by 
bringing together moral philosophy and the scientific study of animal welfare in the context of 
industrial animal farming. Although the facts and research exist, they have so far mostly 
remained independent of the ethical questions industrial animal farming raises. Discussion will 
draw upon empirical studies and scientific theory to debate the three main areas of evolutionary 
closeness, pain and physical discomfort, and psychological suffering to demonstrate how the 
conditions and practises in industrial farming affect animal welfare. The evidence presented 
regarding whether animals suffer in industrial conditions is used to conclude that it is not 
morally acceptable to continue to industrially farm animals. The impacts of industrial animal 
farming upon the environment, human health, violence and animal welfare additiona lly 
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CHAPTER  1:  INTRODUCTION  
Industrial animal farming (IAF), also sometimes referred to as factory farming or confined 
animal feeding operations (CAFO), is the biggest cause of animal abuse in the world today. 
Conservative estimates propose that over 53 billion animals are intensively reared and killed 
for consumption each year with approximately 3,000 dying in slaughterhouses every second, 
not including marine animals (ADAPTT, n.d). The scale is so large that to achieve a 
comparable amount of death in humans we would have to kill the entire human population 
seven times over each year (based on the current 7.4 billion world population estimate). It is 
not surprising then, that in order to produce and process such a high number of animals and 
their products, they are reared and killed in a manner which is likely to raise serious ethical 
questions. Given this, what is surprising is the lack of academic and scientific engagement with 
an issue that is worthy to be at the forefront of professional debate. Barring a few exceptions, 
the cause has mainly fallen upon animal activists who are left to question the conditions of the 
IAF system, unaided by wider criticism.  
Until recent years, the movement against IAF is not one that has resulted in many highly 
significant changes. In some aspects the attempt to improve or change the industrial farming 
systems has even taken steps backwards; the UK Conservative government aimed to reduce 
farming regulations (Conservative Party, n.d) and even repealed some of the animal welfare 
codes within the chicken industry (Mason, 2016). There are several reasons why the movement 
for farmed animal welfare does not seem to be as successful as other movements of its kind, 
the main one being that unlike humans, animals are unable to mobilise and speak out for 
themselves. Animals are therefore dependent upon humans to speak for them which is not as 
effective at invoking empathy as the victims themselves detailing their suffering. There have 
been huge improvements in companion and exotic animal welfare as empathy has been 
extended, but animals used for consumption are somewhat excluded from this change. Peter 
Singer has proposed a number of reasons why even less consideration is given to farmed 
animals, these include conservatism over what we eat, the profit producers make from the 
system and the heavy influence of tradition and history on our perceptions of animals and food  
(Singer, 1975).  
The fundamental concern with IAF which forms the basis of this thesis is often dismissed in 
academia as one for ‘animal lovers’ and not worthy of intellectual enquiry (Linzey, 2008). 
However, the issue of IAF is one over the basic concerns of oppression and use; to object to 
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opposing these problems when they are placed upon animals is to make them not issues in 
themselves but instead turn them into principles that are context dependant (Singer, 1975). This 
thesis is not concerned with the debate around eating meat per se; the morality of killing another 
being and the related issue of consuming and using animal products is a different debate, the 
focus is instead on the methods of production and mainly confined to addressing animal 
welfare. Additionally, the present thesis is not the place to question the necessity for animal 
products in detail (although it is relevant in assessing the necessity of IAF) but evidence 
suggests that diets which omit animal products are not only adequate but also massive ly 
decrease the risk of health problems such as heart disease, obesity and some cancers (e.g. 
Bouvard, et al., 2016; Pan, et al., 2012; Yokoyama, et al., 2014). Throughout the thesis there 
will be specific focus on chickens, pigs and cows but that is not to say that the industrial farming 
of other species is any less significant. There are many more species within the West that are 
intensively farmed, including fish, rabbits, sheep, lambs, horses, ducks, turkeys, geese and 
goats while in the East dogs and cats are commonly bred for food. However, in the West 
chickens, pigs and cows are the species which are most considered to be for food, yet it is worth 
noting that engaging in industrial animal farming regardless of species is likely to be just as 
problematic.  
1.1 Thesis aims 
The main aim of the thesis will be to provide a discussion over what scientific theory and 
evidence can tell us about whether animals suffer in IAF and what this in turn can contribute 
to the wider moral debate over whether it is morally acceptable to continue to industrially farm 
animals. Science can aid in determining how exactly the welfare of farmed animals is being 
effected by current farming practices. To do this, the capabilities of farmed animals to 
biologically and psychologically suffer will be addressed by presenting and discussing 
evidence and theories from three main areas: evolutionary closeness, pain and physical 
discomfort, and psychological suffering. In examining these areas there will be an attempt to 
relate them to the philosophical and moral debate within animal ethics. 
In using scientific works and ideas from moral philosophy, there will also be an attempt to fill 
a gap in the current animal rights debate. Understanding whether animals have the capacities 
that allow them to suffer and how these are effected is an important part of the argument. 
However, the science and facts that inform these points have not been commonly and 
comprehensively presented as a strong and mainstream argument within the animal rights 
3 
 
debate. Although the facts and research exist, they have so far mostly remained independent of 
the ethical questions IAF raises.  It can thus be hoped that by introducing science and facts to 
animal ethics not only will the issues of IAF be taken up in professional circles as an important 
matter of discussion but that it will also speak to a wider audience. Additionally, in integrat ing 
the areas of science and philosophy, it will also show how science can be used to support the 
area of animal ethics and how moral questions can also play a role in the application of science. 
In doing so, it is hoped that the thesis will contribute to answering the question of whether 
science can have anything to say with regards to moral issues.  
One last aim of the thesis is to show how questions of animal ethics, specifically within IAF, 
are relevant to peace. For example, IAF can be argued to be responsible for a substantial amount 
of both direct and structural violence, which is a barrier to the attainment of both negative and 
positive peace. In line with aims of development and positive change (United Nations, n.d), 
peace and conflict studies does not benefit from its general lack of attention to issues of 
potential injustice done to non-human animals. Issues of animal welfare are as deserving of the 
attention of peace studies as much as central issues like armed conflicts and the oppression of 
minorities.  
1.2 Method 
The thesis will draw heavily upon scientific theories, methods and research to form a basis 
from which to understand animal suffering in IAF and its moral significance. Much of the 
evidence used will be based upon pre-existing literature in the form of academic research 
papers and studies carried out in the fields of evolutionary biology, animal pain, animal 
psychology and veterinary sciences. There will also be several key authors whose works and 
opinions will be drawn upon throughout the thesis, most notably Richard Dawkins in the realm 
of evolutionary origins and history and Sam Harris in relation to moral considerations. The 
works of academics such as Marina Stamp-Dawkins, Dr Donald Broom and Marc Bekoff will 
be used to inform the debates around animal experiences and the potential for physical and 
psychological suffering.  
It is worth noting that there is downside to using this method. The sources used were gathered 
through either directly searching for them and topics similar to them, or through following 
citations within these sources. A wide variety of books were also used which again were self-
selected based on relevance to the thesis topics. The main problem with this is the potential for 
bias with regards to the nature of the information gathered and used. For instance, based on 
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search terms used, sources favouring one position may be more prevalent than another and thus 
skew the direction of arguments, sections or even the whole thesis. However, any information 
bias is somewhat offset due to most of the sources being scientific in nature and therefore 
placing importance upon objectivity, often ensured through adherence to strict methodology’s 
and controls. 
1.3 Research questions  
The two main research questions to be answered are: 1) how do conditions and practises in IAF 
cause animals to suffer? 2) is it morally reasonable and acceptable to subject animals to 
industrial farming systems? In addition to answering these two questions the thesis will 
simultaneously show how addressing animal welfare questions can contribute to a deeper, more 
encompassing understanding of peace.  
Chapter 2 will begin by outlining the core philosophical concepts and ideas which will be used 
throughout. Chapter 3 will provide a descriptive summary of IAF including common treatments 
and practises as well as environmental and health implications, while chapter 4 will discuss 
how IAF and animal welfare concerns in general are relevant to the field of peace studies. 
Chapters 5 to 7 will make up the main debate and will examine the areas of evolution, biology 
and physiology, and psychology respectively, before ending with an overall conclusion in 
Chapter 8.  
CHAPTER  2:  PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT 
This chapter will start by outlining some of the core philosophical terms and positions which 
have relevance to the field of animal ethics and the IAF debate in particular. The following 
section will attempt to explain how and why science and moral philosophy should each engage 
with the other, before moving on to establish criteria and positions for use in the assessment of 
welfare and moral equality in the last section.  
2.1 Background to animal ethics 
There are three main positions or beliefs regarding animal ethics which lie along a continuum; 
that animals completely lack moral status, animals possess moral status but it is lesser than that 
of human, and that all animals are more or less equal in moral status. The position held 
subsequently determines attitude towards and treatment of animals, for example, those who 
hold a moral orthodox view that animals have some, but not equal, status promote humane 
treatment in most cases but believe welfare should be compromised where it may benefit 
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humans (Garner, 2005). Conversely, one key approach within the moral equality position is 
that of utilitarianism which was founded by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) who stated that 
people should attempt to maximise the overall amount of happiness and pleasure in relation to 
pain and suffering, often called Bentham’s Greatest Happiness Principle (Kalof & Fitzgera ld, 
2007, p. 4). Since then, utilitarianism has developed and expanded from the classical/hedonist ic 
position of Bentham to include variants such as act, rule and preference utilitarianism, which 
differ with regards to the basis upon which equal consideration is weighed. Regardless of 
criteria, the primary idea is that behaviour ought to be centred towards ‘maximising satisfact ion 
of interests’ overall, and therefore not just of ourselves or of Homo Sapiens (Matheny, 2006); 
in order to maximise overall satisfaction, the interests of all individuals involved have to be 
taken into account. At its simplest level, utilitarianism is a theory of moral equality that 
generally holds that there is no legitimate reason to award non-human animals a lesser moral 
position than humans (Wilson, n.d).  
One of the most recognised variants of utilitarianism, especially with regards to animal rights, 
is preference utilitarianism and is most closely associated with Peter Singer. Preference 
utilitarianism emphasises that human behaviour should be centred towards the satisfaction of 
wants and preferences, in which equal weight should be given regardless of species 
membership (Hill, 1996). Singer (1975) added to this approach in introducing the principle of 
the equal consideration of interests; consideration should not depend on what abilities etc. a 
being does or does not possess so lesser importance should not be placed upon the interests of 
animals than those of humans, interest should instead be awarded equal weight where they are  
common (Wilson, n.d). Equal consideration consequently involves determining the interest 
present and how they are affected (Wilson, n.d), especially with regards to the universa l ly 
common interest of living a life with pleasure in the absence of excessive and unnecessary pain 
(Singer, 1975). However, utilitarianism and equal consideration do not imply that species 
should be given identical treatment; there exists some differences between species that render 
certain rights needless, equality is instead equal consideration of common interests and may 
therefore result in different treatments and rights between species (Singer, 1975, p. 2). 
Therefore, the equal consideration of interests principle allows for the disposal of the view that 
species membership is what matters morally, to express an attitude otherwise can be referred 
to as ‘speciesism’; described by Richard Ryder as a prejudice, not unlike racism or sexism, 
which discriminates based upon irrelevant features and characteristics (Ryder, 1991). In 
expanding upon this concept, Peter Singer defined speciesism as ‘prejudice or attitude of bias 
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in favour of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of 
other species’ (Singer, 1975, p. 6). To state the primacy of human concerns when one is given 
the chance to justify subjecting one species to something over another is a common 
demonstration of speciesism (Garner, 2005, p. 19).  
When it comes to animal ethics and the concept of speciesism, it is briefly worth mentioning 
the importance of engaging in moral philosophical debate. Posner states that it is fact alone 
which holds the persuasive power in changing attitudes and perceptions, and that all moral and 
philosophical debate on an issue is ineffective as beliefs about the status of animals ‘cannot be 
shaken by philosophy’ (Singer & Posner, 2001). However, to counter the view that 
philosophical debate is redundant it can be argued that the point of ethics is to use a normative 
theory to examine the unexamined beliefs and values we hold to see if there is any valid 
justification for holding them (Garner, 2005), which in animal ethics are the beliefs about the 
status of humans and, in particular relation to IAF, the beliefs we hold about the status of 
farmed animals. Singer elaborates on the necessity of moral debate in addition to factual 
evidence by suggesting that even though evidence will go a long way in giving humans more 
empathy towards animals, it does not explain why we should subsequently retain and act upon 
such newfound empathy (Singer & Posner, 2001).  
2.2 Merging science and animal ethics 
It is a common belief that the areas of science and philosophy are completely separable, 
founded on the conviction that neither area can inform the other; scientists cannot answer 
philosophical questions and philosophers can add nothing to scientific disciplines (Harris, 
2010a). However, this traditional view of the relationship can be challenged and reflected upon 
in two ways: firstly, can science be relevant to moral philosophy and secondly, why should 
they interact to address moral issues. With regards to the former, there have been some attempts 
to address this gap such as paring biology (Rodd, 1990) or cognitive ethology (Bekoff & 
Jamieson, 1990) with animal ethics. The general relevance of facts and science in answering 
moral questions is explained by Sam Harris (2010b) who maintains that the values we hold are 
usually, in some way, concerned with living creatures, meaning our moral and ethical positions 
are also directed towards conscious receivers. What most moral dilemmas have in common is 
that they directly engage with the wellbeing of the conscious person or people involved (Harris, 
2010a); a factor which can be seen as fundamentally scientific. That is, welfare is mainly 
comprised of health factors both physical and mental which can be subject to objective 
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measurement and study using scientific theory and method (Broom, 2016). Harris therefore 
proposes that all human values and moral concerns essentially come down to scientific facts 
(Harris, 2010b). 
Harris further clarifies that if there are basic factual truths about what constitutes good welfare, 
and assuming we generally desire to have high welfare, then there are also basic moral truths 
(2010a). Therefore, in following this reasoning, the general principle would be that anything 
which causes avoidable detriment to welfare is morally wrong. Harris does not explicit ly 
extend these ideas to include the welfare of animals in any significant way but in using his 
rationale that human values are informed by facts on welfare, animals are inescapably involved; 
welfare applies to animals much the same way as it does to humans in that they can suffer and 
be affected by ill health. The moral orthodoxy, which permits some exploitations of animals, 
will arguably only change if animals are shown to be morally equal to humans or that ‘their 
interest are comparable in most ways’ (Garner, 2005, p. 17). Interests such as not experienc ing 
pain or mental deprivation are also interests in not having poor welfare, thus assessments of 
animal welfare are a solid basis from which to examine the morality of IAF. The scientific 
consensus brought on by such assessments can help determine what constitutes good welfare 
in order to inform us which choices and actions are more morally correct.  
With regards to why science and moral philosophy should interact, it can be suggested that in 
the case of more layered moral issues, which do not always result in clear or direct effects, 
informed reasoning can be beneficial. Joshua Green suggests that for those frequent occasions 
in which science does not provide an obvious answer to moral questions, we instead have to 
engage ourselves in moral reasoning (Green, 2010). Usually, people make decisions to moral 
dilemmas by using ‘moral intuition’, a set of basic, automatic rules which are a product of our 
biology, culture and individual experiences. Green states that in the past this kind of thinking 
was sufficient, as ethical dilemmas tended to be less complex and globalised. However as 
intuitions are less dynamic they may produce untailored moral responses which are not 
appropriate for maximising welfare. Therefore in addition to moral intuition, Green explains 
that people possess another form of moral decision making which utilises reason to engage in 
deeper, more informed contemplation (2010). Moral reasoning is thus the manual form of 
moral engagement and is conscious, deliberate and flexible. By using reasoning, responses can 
be customised to the unique context of the moral issue at hand, perhaps producing a more 
appropriate conclusion and response.  
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Intuition is a tool often used by philosophers in moral discussion but when it comes to questions 
of animal ethics and welfare, it is particularly difficult to invoke for the animal defence side of 
the debate (Garner, 2005, p. 17). Reaching answers to such questions thus requires intelligent 
analysis by paying attention to the facts and contexts involved, being informed by the science 
and evidence, as well as engaging in higher order thinking such as logic and critical analys is 
(Green, 2010). With regards to the ethical questions concerning IAF, Green suggests that we 
need to use our ability to think in depth about a topic as we do not have any biologically or 
culturally generated response which are particularly appropriate for dealing with its many 
impacts; the particular environmental, health and animal welfare concerns are new situations 
for us. Our ability to deliberately try to find the most ethical and beneficial solution, detached 
from emotion, is what will benefit us when faced with these new problems and it is in this way 
that the integration of science and moral philosophy will have one of its biggest impacts.  
An additional reason why science and moral philosophy should be united is that both the causes 
of promoting science based reason and that of animal ethics can mutually benefit from 
engaging with each other. Robert Johnson (2014) states that those who work for the promotion 
of scientific engagement believe that the cause already has enough to concern itself with in 
engaging with religious extremism and secularism so are thus reluctant to become involved 
with alternative ethical issues. However, animal ethics has relevance to hundreds of billions of 
beings, including humans, and in many cases is significant in determining the life and death of 
many of them. It is hence worthy of the attentions of science promotion. That being said, 
promoting science based reason should also become involved with animal ethics, and moral 
questions in general, for its own sake. There are direct benefits to some of the key goals of 
science promotion in engaging with animal ethics, including those of progress, positive change 
and development; applying science to everyday life is therefore not just promoted for its own 
sake, but also with the desire to see improvement in current global conditions (Johnson, 2014). 
More specifically, challenging constructed hierarchies and speciesism is perhaps critical if we 
want to be able to advance our knowledge of other species and the natural world (Carroll, 
2011). Since these concepts are at the very core of the justification and legitimisation of systems 
such as IAF, fur farming and animal tourist attractions, challenging them from a scientific 
perspective can inform understanding and initiate progress for moral betterment. Therefore by 
applying science to issues within animal ethics, it is further adding to its value as a cause which 
aims for and achieves positive development and the reduction of violence. 
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There also exists particular benefits to animal ethics itself in actively pursuing positions from 
a scientific perspective. Those who engage in the cause of animal ethics are reluctant to 
advocate another under the belief that their own cause is the most important (Johnson, 2014). 
However, it can be argued that this is a doing disservice to the animal ethics argument; the lack 
of engagement with science causes a gap in the existing debate. Failing to provide concrete 
evidence and scientific arguments as to why other species should not be subject to use, is to 
fail to provide reasons why humans should extend their empathy to other species. As Singer 
states, our moral concern should only ever end at the point where ‘there is no awareness of pain 
or pleasure, and no preference of any kind’ (Singer & Posner, 2001). Regarding IAF, promoting 
the scientific evidence can add information about what constitutes good and bad welfare, by 
referring to subjects such as body systems, tissue damage, effects of pathogens and 
physiological and psychological disorders (Broom, 1998). Additionally, incorporating the 
cause of science functions to add legitimacy to the attempts to engage in animal ethics for the 
betterment of animal welfare, including within the food industries. Bringing IAF as a moral 
issue into professional and academic circles will not only prompt higher rational discussion in 
order to inform opinion and policy, it will also perhaps dissipate the somewhat negative 
perception often attributed to those who speak against modern farming and which essentia lly 
damages the animal rights cause.  
Overall, despite the traditional views to the contrary, science is extremely relevant to animal 
ethics and vice versa. While Harris (2010b) tells us that science can be relevant to animal ethics 
because morals are essentially truths about welfare that can factually determine what is morally 
right and wrong, Green (2010) explains why they should, by highlighting the importance of 
conscious, detached thinking about moral questions for understanding. In addition to direct 
relevance, science and animal ethics can both benefit their own causes by actively engaging 
with the other.  
2.3 Criteria for judgements 
In order to be able to determine what is and is not morally acceptable in IAF, it is important to 
clarify what is meant by certain terms, as well as establish points at which certain practises and 
conditions become unacceptable. When discussing the case for moral equality it should be 
understood that the term here refers to the principle of equal consideration of interests discussed 
earlier. Interests are significant as they describe what is beneficial or positive for a being, such 
as an interest in not feeling pain and suffering (Animal Ethics, n.d(a)). From a position of moral 
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equality, the capacity to suffer is not only necessary but actually sufficient in saying that 
animals have an interest in not suffering (Singer, 1975, pp. 7-8). There are three main areas 
involved in the assessment of animal welfare, all of which can be subject to scientific 
investigation: animal functioning, affective state (feeling or emotion) and ability of an animal 
to live according to its nature (von Keyserlingk, et al., 2009). These areas can be determined 
by paying attention to many factors including absence of pain, good health and displays of 
natural behaviours which, if met, indicate the presence of good welfare (ibid.). If any of these 
factors are compromised then, depending on to what degree, welfare can be said to be poor. 
Given that welfare basically comprises of health and ‘happiness’, being in a state of high 
welfare can also be seen as an interest. Therefore, exploring whether animal welfare is affected 
by conditions in IAF also indicates whether farmed animals have interests which are also 
affected, what these interests are and what implications they hold regarding moral equality.  
Identifying appropriate cut off points for acceptable levels of suffering or welfare is no 
straightforward task. However, for present purposes there are two main questions that will be 
asked when considering what is morally acceptable and not: is the suffering necessary, and is 
it justified. Determining if a practice that causes suffering, regardless of the amount, is 
necessary involves looking at whether there are other available solutions to the problem; that 
is, are there alternatives which would not cause suffering but which would achieve the same 
goal, or are changes available that would render the practise in question needless. Deciding 
whether a practice is justified means examining if there are sufficient benefits in doing so. With 
regards to the animals themselves, a utilitarian approach of maximisation of benefits should be 
used; a practise that causes suffering can be acceptable if overall benefits to animals are higher 
for doing so. However, acceptability is less clear when it comes to factoring in benefits to 
humans. In this context, all ways in which animal suffering could be related to benefits to 
humans essentially comes down to how beneficial IAF is to humans. Although this is perhaps 
a rather complex discussion, there is no shortage of evidence that IAF has many detrimenta l 
effects on humans, something which will be discussed in detail in sections 3.2 and 4.2. 
Discussion in chapters 5-7 will therefore operate on the assumption that IAF as it stands is not 
going to prove of sufficient benefit to humans to justify low animal welfare. 
From a more personal perspective, it is felt that IAF is a method which has high potential to be 
detrimental to animal welfare, humans and the environment and is one which, due to its 
methods and goals, cannot realistically be prevented from being so. Given this, the only 
sustainable and compassionate solution seems to lie in ending the practice of industrial farming 
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which would mean ending our dependence on meat, eggs and dairy. Although completely 
eliminating animal products from our diets may seem at first a rather extreme position to take, 
it is in fact in line with the principles of anti-speciesism. Even in the unlikely event that 
conditions within IAFs were improved sufficiently so that farmed animals seemed to no longer 
suffer up until the point of slaughter, some critical facts would remain. In such a likelihood, it 
would still be acceptable for certain species to be bred, taken from others of their kind, deprived 
of a natural environment and killed prematurely. Therefore, the ideal would be to end all 
intensive animal agriculture as it is speciesist in nature, regardless of how it is improved. 
However, the elimination of all activities which can be considered speciesist is highly unlike ly 
or will at best take a very long time. In the meantime, IAF’s continue to operate, which is why 
despite the anti-speciesist position stated above, it is important to take a more orthodox animal 
welfare approach in order to encourage improvement in the present. It can then be hoped that 
with improved welfare and increased exposure to the realities of IAF, societal attitudes with 
regards to food and animal welfare will move in a more compassionate direction.  
CHAPTER  3:  BACKGROUND TO IAF 
The current chapter will provide background information which will form a basis from which 
to assess the morality of IAF in further chapters. The first section will provide a brief 
description of IAF including the standard treatment for chickens, cows and pigs. The second 
section will then detail some of the wider impacts IAF has on the environment and human 
health.  
3.1 Industrial animal farming (IAF)  
Industrial animal farming is a method of producing animals used in consumption, either 
directly for meat or for animal derived foods, mainly milk and eggs. IAF’s are standardised 
systems characterised by high animal density, intensive production, use of modern machinery 
and a subsequent high output (Gurian-Sherman, 2008). The turn to industrialised methods in 
the production of animals for food was sparked by the development of modern technologies in 
the mid-20th century, in which newly discovered methods of production were applied to food 
(Singer, 1975). Intensification and subsequent growth in expectations led to a massive increase 
in the amount of meat needed to keep up with demand, in which smaller scale methods of 
animals farming were not sufficient (ibid.). In fact, it has been estimated that the number of 
animals produced and slaughtered for consumption is ten times what it was in the 1940’s, and  
continues to grow (Imhoff, 2010); chickens raised for meat in the US alone have increased by 
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500% since 1966 (Gurian-Sherman, 2008). Contrary to the misconception, farmed animals 
have not always been kept and reared intensively. Although the domestication of wild animals 
into high yielding farmed animals did occur during the agricultural revolution around 12,000 
years ago, the scale, intensity and methods we see today are a relatively modern invention 
(Harari, 2015). 
Despite the animal rights revolution in the 1970s’ sparked by the publication of a number of 
key works such as Animal Liberation (Singer, 1975) and Animal Machines (Harrison, 1964), 
the prevalence of IAF continues to grow.  The rising level of public and media attention towards 
the food industry has led some of the biggest meat producers in the world, such as Tyson Foods 
and Cargill, to take steps in commitments to animal welfare (e.g. Tyson Foods, inc., 2015; 
Cargill, n.d). Key developments include the publication of audit results, farm assurance 
schemes, increased regulations on antibiotic use and annual training for employees working 
with animals. Attempts at improvement have also been made at the international level, such as 
the 2012 EU ban on conventional battery cages for hens and the 2006 ban on veal crates which 
traditionally kept calves anaemic and immobile until slaughter. On the other hand, these 
improvements can be criticised as far from adequate in assuring high animal welfare ; 
subsequent ‘enriched’ and colony cages offer no improvement in overall conditions or 
treatment (Animal Aid, n.d(a)) while veal calves can still be subject to barren confinement and 
deprivation of exercise (HSUS, 2012a). Therefore, although farmed animals used for 
agricultural purposes are afforded protections by the EU (Council of Europe, 1976), and to a 
lesser extent in the US by legislation such as the Humane Slaughter Act (USDA, 1978), in 
reality they are often far from adequate in providing significant improvement.  
Before moving on to detail the specific practises that occur in the production of chickens, pigs 
and cows, it is worth mentioning some of the wider welfare concerns present in animal 
agriculture in general. Firstly, regardless of how each species is raised and slaughtered they all 
suffer the potential for abuse and neglect by the individuals employed either at factory farms 
or slaughterhouses. There have been numerous undercover investigations conducted in recent 
years which have revealed abuse by employees in a wide range of animals and locations. 
Although there are too many such operations to mention here they include instances such as 
pigs being scalded alive at a Belgium slaughterhouse in 2017 (Animal Rights, n.d), chickens 
so roughly handled for packing their wings are broken (Animal Aid, 2014), dairy cows with 
lameness and open sores having to lie down in their own waste (CIWF, 2012), and pigs in 
Spain being kicked, beaten with metal poles, stabbed with swords and even disembowelled 
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alive (Animal Equality, 2012). These investigations reveal that deliberate neglect, abuse and 
cruelty is a somewhat common occurrence in IAF and is mostly unmonitored. An additiona l 
problem faced by all factory farmed animals are the long transport durations which, in the EU, 
can legally last for up to 29 hours at a time in crowded conditions in which dehydration, hunger, 
stress and crushing causes prolonged suffering and even death (Robinson, et al., 2015a). Lastly, 
farmed animals are more vulnerable to death from factory fires, transport accidents and natural 
disasters; in the UK alone there are hundreds of case studies in which animals have been killed 
as a result of overturned lorries, floods, exposure and starvation after being stranded (Martin, 
2014). All farmed animals in a system with inadequate welfare protection and lack of 
monitoring are therefore vulnerable to suffering at any stage of the rearing, transportation and 
slaughter processes. However, there are additional, unique welfare issues present within the 
production of each farmed animal.  
3.1.1 Chickens 
By far the most frequently farmed animals are chickens, with meat and egg industr ies 
producing more than 50 billion worldwide per year (CIWF, n.d(a)). Chickens produced for 
meat, or ‘broilers’, are typically confined to large housing units which contain anything from 
10,000 to 50,000 birds per shed where they stay from 1 day old until about 6-7 weeks before 
slaughter (RSPCA, n.d(a)). Overcrowding means broilers are often afflicted with a number of 
health issues. Some of these include: ammonia burns from high levels of faeces, feather loss 
from abrasion and pecking as well as frequent cases of trampling and cannibalism. 
Additionally, since chickens reared for meat are bred and fed in such a way as for them to gain 
as much weight as possible as fast as possible they are often unable to support their own weight, 
hence many are lame or unable to move in order to feed (CIWF, 2013). Once broilers have 
reached a profitable weight to be sold they, like all meat producing animals, are transported to 
a slaughterhouse where they are pre-stunned, slaughtered on an automated blade and passed 
through a scalding bath to loosen and remove feathers. Although it is required by EU law that 
all chickens be stunned prior to slaughter, typically through an electrically charged water bath 
or gas stunning, a lot of the time it is ineffective in rendering the chickens unconscious (Animal 
Aid, n.d(b)).  
Egg laying hens are also subject to high levels of confinement throughout their lives. Despite 
the progress in phasing out ‘battery’ cages in the EU the majority of hens are still typically 
confined to so-called ‘enriched’ cages.  These consist of ‘colonies’ in which cages hold 60-80 
hens, each having approximately the size of an A4 piece of paper to move (Animal Aid, n.d(a)). 
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One of the standard practices within egg-laying flocks is that of beak trimming which involves 
cutting or burning away the front of the beaks to avoid injurious pecking between birds, but 
which also effects feeding and preening (Bowles, et al., 2015). The male chicks produced in 
the egg industry are not considered profitable so are killed en masse on their first day of life 
usually by being macerated , gassed or simply piled into containers where they are crushed or 
suffocated (Tyler, 2011). When hens pass their egg-laying peak they are often then sent to 
slaughterhouses where they go through a similar process to broilers but are instead used for 
cheap pre-made foods (Singer, 1975, p. 118). 
3.1.2 Cows 
The last 50 years or so has seen an increasing intensification in milk production with 250 
million cows currently producing milk globally, 23 million of which are in the EU alone 
(CIWF, n.d(b)). Increasing demand for milk has led to increased confinement and, more 
recently, a growing number of ‘zero grazing’ dairy farms. Zero grazing systems do not allow 
any time grazing outdoors and, despite still only making up a minority of dairy farms, are 
becoming increasing popular within the US and the UK (CIWF, n.d(e)). Most standard dairy 
farms do allow cows to spend part of the year outside although they are confined to cubicles 
for the other part. Both types of system however, generate potential welfare problems for the 
health of the cows although it has been found that ‘zero grazing’ farms have a higher prevalence 
of lameness, mastitis, nutritional deficiency and overall poor bodily health (CIWF, Eurogroup 
for Animals, 2015). Frequent disfigurement in dairy cow joints and hips can be observed due 
to weak bones and unnatural udder size which have been genetically selected for maximum 
yield. Most dairy cows hold a life span of around 4-5 years (as opposed to 25 year natural life 
expectancy) because they are typically sent to slaughter when they are unable to continue the 
cycle of insemination, pregnancy, birth and lactation. As with hens, dairy cows give birth to 
around 50% male offspring which are less useful to the milk industry than the females. 
Increasingly these calves are being used for meat despite not being as profitable as calves bred 
for the purpose but over 50,000 male calves are still killed at birth per year in the UK alone 
(CIWF, n.d(c)).  
It is also worth briefly mentioning cows produced for meat, both for beef and calves used for 
veal. Traditionally, calves destined to be killed at a young age for veal were permanently 
confined to ‘veal crates’ or barren wooden stall where they were then kept anaemic, fed a liquid 
diet and tied down to stop them moving and building up muscle (Singer, 1975). Although ‘veal 
crates’ have now been banned throughout the EU, the persistence of barren, confined 
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conditions and relatively young ages of slaughter in veal production would still not meet legal 
requirements in many European countries (RSPCA, n.d(b)). Those cows raised for beef and 
veal are also subject to castration, often without anaesthetic, by either applying rubber rings to 
the scrotum or through surgery (Tyler, 2011). Cows reared for beef are killed at around 18-22 
months but are granted more grazing time than most industrially farmed animals and spend 
most of their lives outdoors in feedlots (Explore beef, 2009). Both beef and dairy cows are 
slaughtered similarly by stunning with a captive bolt gun before they are killed by severing a 
major artery (Robinson, et al., 2015b).  Cattle used for milk and meat are therefore subject to 
some form of genetic manipulation and sent to slaughter as soon as productivity wanes or 
potential profit is at its highest.  
3.1.3 Pigs 
Over half of the world’s 1.3 billion population of pigs reared for meat are done so industria l ly, 
mainly in China and the West (CIWF, n.d(d)). In order to produce such high numbers sows are 
continuously bred and so, as with dairy cows, are only able to remain productive for 4-5 years 
before they become exhausted and are sent to slaughter. Although nearly all industrially farmed 
pigs are reared indoors and spend all or most of their lives in sheds, breeding sows are confined 
to farrowing crates and sow stalls for weeks before, after and during pregnancy. These crates 
are individual confinement spaces in which sows are unable to move or turn around, from this 
position piglets can be systematically fed. Despite an EU ban on sow stalls, they are still 
permitted to be used for up to four weeks after a sow has been inseminated and farrowing crates 
continue to be widely used (RSPCA, n.d(c)). Piglets also undergo a number of mutilat ions 
before being placed in close confinement. These include teeth clipping, tail amputation (‘tail 
docking’) and castration of male piglets, all of which are performed in the absence of any pain 
medication. Premature death in pigs is relatively high compared to other industrially farmed 
animals with an estimated 12% dying from neglect, disease and psychological stress (Tyler, 
2011). Those that do survive rearing and transport to arrive at the slaughterhouse then go 
through the slaughter process which in itself may compromise welfare. For example, electrica l 
pre-stunning may in some cases take multiple electrocutions to incapacitate the animals or the 
time left before killing may be left too long so that the animals are not unconscious before they 
are slaughtered (Robinson, et al., 2015b). Pigs are therefore subject to highly intens ive 
confinement and are kept in conditions which may exasperate the development and spread of 
bacteria and disease.  
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3.2 Effects of IAF 
Beyond the direct impacts that IAF has on farmed animal welfare there are also huge alternat ive 
costs which warrant significant consideration, the most noteworthy of which concern the 
environmental and human health.   
3.2.1 Environment  
Intensification has a large impact upon the environment, for which there are a number of major 
ecological consequences. The first of these is the high level of deforestation due to land 
clearance to feed and raise cattle, making the needs of IAF one of the biggest causes of 
deforestation. Other than the obvious destruction and loss of nature involved in deforestation 
there a couple of other direct effects, the first of which is contribution to global warming. 
Clearing large areas of trees for land is the source of 11% of human greenhouse gas production 
as not only do dead trees, stumps and leaves produce CO2, the lower amounts of overall flora 
means less CO2 absorption and O2 production (Conservation International, n.d). Animal 
agriculture and its by-products are in fact the biggest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions 
equalling 51% of the global output (Goodland & Anhang, 2009), this is significantly more than 
the 14% contribution to emissions from all human transport put together (IPCC, 2014).  
Additionally, deforestation is also the largest cause of decreasing global biodiversity and loss 
of plant and animal species in recent decades. This specific effect is not surprising given that 
80% of the worlds land animal and plant species live in forests (WWF, n.d), any large scale 
clearance of habitat is thus going to destroy their means of survival. Even in countries which 
no longer witness a high level of deforestation, such as the UK, conversion of the natural 
environment to fields and farmland has had an increasingly negative effect on the local wildlife. 
According to the most recent RSPB State of Nature report the UK has seen a decline in 56% 
of its species, 15% of which have been so severe they are under threat of extinction from the 
UK altogether (Hayhow, et al., 2016). The overall loss of biodiversity impacts both local and 
global ecosystems, is a detriment to the environment as it causes widespread destruction of 
wilderness (Monbiot, 2013), thus is an obvious cause for concern.  
The last of the wider environmental impacts of IAF is perhaps one of the most critical; ocean 
pollution. IAF’s produce pollution from chemical and manure run-off, as well as dumping fish 
offal and fat back into the sea, which results in ocean degradation. The combined effects of  
this and overfishing cause huge ocean ‘deadzones’ or areas of algae boom which are so polluted 
and toxic they are unable to support life (Lymbery & Oakeshott, 2014a, p. 97). Although IAF 
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does not seem initially linked to the problem of overfishing it does in fact create a significant 
contribution in that the industry uses fishmeal for animal feed and fish oil for fish farming. 
Nearly a third of all global fish catch is used in these process (Animal Aid, 2013), much of 
which is made from actual marketable fish and not just the waste and offal as often thought 
(Lymbery & Oakeshott, 2014a, p. 83). The overall effects upon the ocean jeopardise 
sustainability, global ecosystems, food production and health and is therefore a serious issue to 
be faced now and in the future. Other direct human costs to environmental destruction concern 
the further inefficient use of resources. The crops produced on deforested land are mainly used 
to produce animal feed for IAF’s. In fact 90% of all worldwide soya and one third of all cereals 
produced go directly to sustaining the animals raised for meat, instead of being used to feed 
people directly (Lymbery & Oakeshott, 2014a, p. 5). Therefore, the impacts of deforestation, 
global warming, loss of wildlife biodiversity and the degradation of the oceans are all 
intensified by IAF. Environmental destruction is a factor that is becoming of increasing concern 
but it is not the only cost created by IAF’s that can be felt by humans.  
3.2.2 Health 
Not only does IAF impact humans through consequences to the environment, it also generates 
a multitude of direct and indirect health costs. Some of the more direct health problems are 
often a result of living in close proximity to industrial farms. Although direct links are difficult 
to determine there have been a number of correlations between asthma, birth defects and 
diseases and living close to factory farms (Lymbery & Oakeshott, 2014a, p. 23). The high 
levels of chemicals, manure spray, viruses and bacteria involved in keeping live animals in 
highly confined conditions may spread and affect those in in the local areas. In addition to 
possible contamination of drinking water there are issues of chemical smog and the 
manifestation of toxic waste lagoons which cause families to have to choose between leaving 
their homes, if even possible, or enduring potentially dangerous conditions (Lymbery & 
Oakeshott, 2014b).  
A less direct yet larger health cost concerns the levels of nutrition in modern industrially farmed 
meat. Most farmed animal raised for consumption are done so in a manner which encourages 
production of as much volume/weight as possible, often through the use of artificial selection, 
steroids and reduced exercise. These methods mean animal meat and milk contains high levels 
of fat which, in the case of broiler chickens, is almost double the levels produced in 1940 before 
specific genetic selection for mass (Purvis, 2005). The high fat and chemical content in both 
meat and dairy, in addition to increased Western consumption is a problem when considering 
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the clear links between high mortality rates and animal proteins (Song, et al., 2016) includ ing 
processed meat (Fields, et al., 2016) and even possibly milk (Michaëlsson, et al., 2014). These 
relationships are not only problems in themselves but also place a large strain upon state 
economies.  
The final health concern worth mentioning is the problem of antibiotic resistance. Although 
the excessive use of antibiotics by humans is one cause of this effect, 50% of all antibiotics are 
used by the farming industry meaning it is a massive contributor to the growing resistance 
(Nathan, 2004). Antibiotic use on farmed animals is mainly done to stimulate growth and 
prevent disease. Antibiotic resistance is a pressing issue as it is increasingly leading to the 
development of resistant bacteria which cause illness and which are harboured in the animals 
and can then fairly easily spread to humans (Horrigan, et al., 2010; CDC, 2013). Despite 
uncertainty over the origins of many superbugs, the recent scares over ‘bird flu’, ‘swine flu’ 
and MRSA all demonstrate that regardless of origins, the issue of superbugs caused by 
antibiotic overuse is a one which has the potential to affect everyone. The fact that the uses of 
antibiotics in IAF’s may not be a necessary, inevitable solution over improved conditions 
demonstrates that one of the most pressing medical issues of the 21st century could have in part 
been avoided. 
Overall, the industrialisation of animal agriculture has led to large scale, systematic farms 
which potentially compromise animal welfare in many ways. In addition to direct concerns 
about farmed animals, intensification continues to have a negative impact upon the 
environment; effecting both the natural world and efficiency in resource allocation and use. 
IAF also contributes to pollution, unhealthy food and the crisis in antibiotic resistance all of 
which directly affect human health.  
CHAPTER  4:  PEACE RELEVANCE 
The current chapter will discuss the ways in which IAF is of relevance to peace and conflict 
studies and the role it plays in the goal of attaining peace on various levels. IAF may be of 
particular relevance to a number of theories and concepts in the field, as well as playing a 
significant role in the creation and maintenance of some forms of structural violence.  
4.1 Achieving peace  
There are implications for the field of peace studies in the possibility that IAF may act as a 
barrier to the realisation of some of the key aims in peace and conflict research. The argument 
19 
 
put forward by Steven Pinker (2011) and declinists in general, that violence today is at its 
lowest level ever and that the 20th and 21st centuries are the most peaceful to date, can be 
questioned when faced with the realities of industrial animal farming. Overall, Pinker’s 
extensive presentation of data and analysis in support of this theory makes it a hard fact to 
dispute in terms of conflict, war and even human rights but falters with regards to any other 
species but our own. Although Pinker does make some effort to address the conditions of other 
species by concluding that the rights and protections of animals have improved, he seems only 
to focus on those species kept as companions or which are considered exotic and endangered. 
This perspective therefore forgets the billions of farmed animals who are denied adequate 
protection laws and are subject to potentially cruel and invasive treatment at a rate which has 
actually massively increased in the past decades (Fraser, 2005). If then, the most common 
species of animals are to be included in the declinist calculation, of which there is no justifiab le 
reason why they should not, it is difficult to maintain that the world is indeed less violent.  
The questions around IAF can also be placed into the context of Galtungs’ theories (1969: 
1996) on violence and peace. The key concepts most worth mentioning are those of negative 
peace and positive peace. Given that Galtung states that the opposite of peace is violence (and 
not conflict) one way peace can be defined is as the absence of direct or overt violence, termed 
‘negative peace’. However, there are many other ways in which a population may not have 
peace despite not experiencing high levels of direct violence, such as those living with injust ice. 
As a result, the concept of positive peace refers to integration, brought about mainly through 
social justice and harmony. It is only in the presence of both negative and positive peace that 
the more encompassing and ideal idea of ‘peace’ can be thought to exist. One additiona l 
concept significant for the realisation of positive peace is the concept of structural violence 
which will be discussed further in the following section.  
The problem with attempting to relate Galtung’s concepts of peace to the issue of IAF  is that 
they do not seem to have been explicitly extended to any species beyond humans; the concepts 
of negative and positive peace do not traditionally include mention of the positions of other 
animals, included farmed animals. However, that is not to say that these concepts cannot or 
should not be considered with regards to other species. For instance, it can be suggested that 
the existence of IAF is a barrier to achieving negative peace as the system applied to animals 
for consumption is potentially one of physical and mental violence. Even if conditions for 
these species were to improve sufficiently so as to eradicate direct violence and suffering, there 
would still remain the question of positive peace. Again, the typical definition of positive peace 
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is specifically human integration, suggesting the conditions of animals is irrelevant. However, 
this seems a somewhat poor definition of ideal peace for even in the absence of direct violence , 
the continued production, confinement and use of farmed animals can be argued to be an unjust 
system in which the presence of suffering is likely. The ideas of peace put forward by Galtung 
and Pinker can be realised but only if we aim to achieve peace for humans alone, regardless of 
what happens to other species; an arguably poor goal for peace studies to limit itself to. 
To expand the conditions of attaining positive peace to include harmony for animals and the 
natural environment would be to reframe Galtung’s traditionally anthropocentric theory into 
one which could also encompass ecocentric concerns. Anthropocentrism is the view that 
humans are the only ones that hold intrinsic value and are the most important element of 
existence, meaning human interests come before all other concerns (Brennan & Lo, 2016). The 
ecocentric position on the other hand, holds that the natural environment and all living 
organisms do hold intrinsic value therefore human concerns are not to be placed over those of 
animals and nature (DesJardins, n.d). The objection to IAF over animal welfare considerations 
is of course following an ecocentric position but that is not to say that holding an 
anthropocentric position is to inevitably support IAF. On the contrary, although the two 
positions are often at odds they can both be used to argue against IAF. Beyond the direct effects 
upon farmed animals, objections can be raised over of the wider negative effects upon the 
environment, wildlife and ecosystems. Ecocentrism would object on the basis of the intrins ic 
value of nature while anthropocentrism can be used to argue that the degradation of the natural 
world is a loss to humans themselves; human enjoyment of natural landscapes and wildlife is 
reason enough to preserve it. Additionally, environmental destruction is a direct threat to 
human survival, and at the very least human potential, meaning IAF’s contribution is an 
obvious anthropocentric concern. Therefore although ecocentrism is the main position here, 
both direct concerns for other organisms and for humans are significant in discussing IAF.  
4.2 Structural violence 
IAF creates an additional barrier to attaining peace by exasperating conditions of structural 
violence. Structural violence is perpetrated by institutions, systems or structures which cause 
either direct harm or prevent people from living to their full potential (Galtung, 1969) and may 
include exploitation, starvation, oppression or even lack of access to services such as education 
and healthcare. Instances of structural violence caused by agricultural industrialisation can be 
observed in less developed countries where local small-scale farming and fishing is often a 
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livelihood (Anderson, 2006). As large multi-national corporations expand and monopolise the 
food industry and developing countries begin to consume more meat, the produce from local 
establishments is becoming redundant. In places where farming or fishing is the only way to 
make a living, the removal of this is to remove not only means to an income but also a way of 
life, especially as many farmers are not equipped with the necessary skills for urban jobs (Kwa, 
2001). Even in those cases where small farms accept the new rearing techniques and 
technologies, farmers still suffer as a result of the high levels of chemicals, poor animal 
conditions and environmental damage the new methods cause (Lymbery & Oakeshott, 2014a, 
p. 254). Therefore, the domination of large scale factory farms in agriculture causes the direct 
loss of livelihood, employment and income as well as pushing the industry towards ever more 
systematic and polluting methods.   
Structural violence is also present on a more global scale in the form of unequal food 
distribution and food waste. There are currently 795 million chronically undernourished people 
in the world today, most of them inhabiting the ‘southern’ countries afflicted by low economic 
development (AO, IFAD, WFP, 2015). This is in contrast to the growth in prevalence of obesity 
in the developed world, caused by an excess of high calorie, fatty foods. The inequality in 
distribution of food means that although there is currently enough food produced worldwide to 
eradicate hunger and undernourishment (Holt-Giménez, et al., 2012), the richer countries get 
considerably more than poorer ones (Leathers & Foster, 2009). This system is an incredib ly 
unjust one, especially considering the amount of food wasted globally, estimates which range 
from one third to as high as 50% of all food produced (Lipinski, et al., 2013). Food waste 
occurs at all points in the production process, the highest being disposal by consumers 
themselves. With regards to animal products specifically, the annual global losses and waste 
of meat is around 20% which is the equivalent to 75 million cows (FAO, n.d(a)). Not only is 
this a waste of food in a world where so many are ill-nourished but the plants grown to sustain 
the meat and dairy industry could instead be used more efficiently and sustainably as a direct 
food source for humans. These crops and the animal products they allow are not only put to 
inadequate use in feeding less developed countries they also, as mentioned earlier, contribute 
to environmental damage. Similarly, this wider contribution to climate change is also a form 
of structural violence upon the people in less developed countries who are unable to protect 
themselves against the effects.  
IAF is of clear relevance to the field of peace and conflict as it arguably poses significant threats 
to attaining and maintaining peace. Industrial animal agriculture is especially salient in creating  
22 
 
structural violence as overproduction of meat, dairy and eggs not only takes away the 
livelihoods of people in developing countries but also contributes to the high levels of waste in 
the West. Nevertheless, the limitations placed upon the achievement of peace by IAF do have 
the potential to be removed in light of a global attitude change towards farmed animals and 
animals in general, including humans, of which science and welfare studies can play an 
important role.  
CHAPTER  5:  EVOLUTION 
The first place science can be applied to animal ethics is through evolution and genetic 
similarity. A benefit to using evolution for refuting speciesism is that it has the potential to 
break down some of the constructions that humans possess about the status and role of their 
own species and of farmed animals. This chapter will therefore attempt to provide some 
answers to the question of whether it is morally reasonable to subject animals to IAF (research 
question 2) based on species categorisation. The first section will provide the background to 
evolution and the following two sections will address issues in the beliefs around 
essentialism/discontinuity and the superiority of Homo sapiens. As the chapter draws heavily 
on the work of Richard Dawkins, section three will provide a critical discussion of Dawkins in 
the context of applying evolution to the question of IAF.   
5.1 Evolution and common ancestors 
Charles Darwin’s (1809-1882) theory of evolution was presented in 1859 in his now most 
famous work On the Origin of Species and was built upon in a subsequent book The Descent  
of Man in 1871. According to Darwin the term evolution refers to the change of organisms over 
time driven by the process of natural selection. Natural selection means that those organisms 
who possess abilities and characteristics which are better suited to their environment are more 
capable of survival, which in turn allows them to reproduce and pass on these characterist ics 
to their offspring (Ridley, 2004a). Those who possess maladaptive characterises will likely die, 
not passing on their characteristics to future generations. Similarly, those who do not possess 
any beneficial characteristics that allow them to better acquire food, shelter and a mate will 
also lose out against those who do. As characterises which aid survival accumulate over 
generations, organisms become more adept at survival and reproduction within their 
environment in a process called ‘adaptation’. Evolution therefore depends upon the external 
environment but also upon the existence of genetic variation within a species (Ridley, 2004a).  
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In order to be classed as a separate species of animal a population must be different enough 
that they cannot and do not interbreed in nature (Ridley, 2004a). However, the term ‘species’ 
is not as straightforward as it may seem. Breeding must occur in nature and not be forced or in 
artificial settings; two animals in constricted environments may still breed even though they 
may not be the same species. Additionally, offspring produced from interbreeding must also 
be fertile. This phenomenon can be observed in mules, the infertile offspring of a horse and a 
donkey. Even so, there are rare cases of different species interbreeding in nature and producing 
fertile offspring – sometimes called hybridisation (Stebbins, 1959). Species is thus a term 
which should not be taken as reflecting rigid naturally occurring rules in nature.   
All species that exist today are descendant from common ancestors and have had approximate ly 
the same amount of time to evolve (Dawkins, 2004a), meaning that no one species is more 
advanced or ‘more evolved’ than any other. Evolution is not a linear process but is instead 
branched and complex with many evolutionary splits and species extinctions. Visual 
representations of evolution are therefore often depicted as a tree, the phylogenetic tree or ‘tree 
of life’ with billions of potential branches (species), each which can be traced back in time to 
reveal shared ancestors with every other species that exists or has existed (Zimmer, 2016).  
Evolutionary origins and time are not the only things shared as the genetic patterns of most 
species are also remarkably similar. If we take one living relative of Homo sapiens, say gorillas, 
and compare the genetic codes of both it can be shown that they share 98.4% of their genomes, 
a rate only beaten by bonobos and chimpanzees (Dunham, 2016). The difference is therefore 
tiny but accounts for all of the observable differences between humans and gorillas. Genetic 
similarity is of course going to be closest between humans and primates but even so the 
difference is not very large even between those animals humans see as less similar to 
themselves. For example, cows share an 80% similarity with humans (Bovine Genome 
Sequencing and Analysis Consortium, et al., 2009) and even birds share the majority, with 
estimates of chicken-human parallels at approximately 60% (Spencer & Westerhouse, 2004).  
5.2 Discontinuous mind  
One way in which the knowledge obtained in understanding evolution can be applied to the 
issue of IAF is through considering the use of essentialism when classing and perceiving other 
animals. Essentialist thinking is the belief that all things have properties that are essential to 
making them what they are, they each possess an ‘essence’ (Robertson & Atkins, 2016). Also 
called ‘discontinuous thinking’ (Dawkins, 2011), it is also present in how we categorise and 
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perceive animals, including those we use for food. However, what the science suggests is that 
the species labels we use on other organisms and ourselves may actually be somewhat 
fictitious. The belief that a pig is a member of a discreet group fundamentally separate from 
humans and all other animal groups can be argued to be an inaccurate construction. The 
essentialist way of thinking with regards to living beings has also been called the ‘tyranny of 
the discontinuous mind’ by Richard Dawkins as it is the tendency to stick to ridged categories 
and deny continuity which has often led to great suffering (2011). Constructions of species can 
be analysed by paying attention to certain phenomena found in evolutionary patterns. 
The existence of these constructs can be revealed by first paying attention to the existence of 
‘ring species’. Ring species are animal populations which are classed as separate species, they 
cannot interbreed, but are connected by a line (or geographical ring) of interbreeding 
populations (Ridley, 2004b). The classic example of a ring species which exists today is that 
of the Herring Gull and the black-backed Gull. Both types of bird are classed as distinct non-
interbreeding species of Gull whose populations live in close proximity to one another 
(Dawkins, 2004b). However, if the population groups of the Herring Gull are observed around 
the world in the northern hemisphere each population is noticeably different from the departing 
Figure 1-Geographical populations of gull around the northern hemisphere. 
Grey arrow indicates point at which interbreeding is not possible. Adapted from 
Darwiniana and Evolution (n.d)  
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species and more like the other; this continues until the end of the ring is reached at the black 
backed Gull with the important factor being that this line is continuously linked by successfully 
interbreeding populations up until the ‘species’ split in the UK (Dawkins, 2004b) (see Figure 
1). There is no point along the chain that one population group is unable to interbreed with the 
other meaning there is also no cut off point in which one population ceases to be one species 
and becomes the other. As there is no point where these species can be classed as completely 
separable the rigidity of essentialist classifications is called into question. 
The unbroken linkage seen in the example of ring species is also present between humans and 
chimpanzees and, by extension, between humans and all other animals. This is not immediate ly 
clear on a day to day basis because all of the intermediates between most species happen to be 
extinct, minus a few rare cases such as the Gulls. In this case it is necessary to observe evolution 
through time as opposed to geographical distance in order to be able to see the indist inct 
connections. The continuous line of interbreeding intermediates between all species actually 
goes back to the common ancestor of any said species before continuing back up the genet ic 
tree to the organisms we see today (Dawkins, 2004b). There is therefore a V-shape of indist inct 
populations which links humans to all farmed animals and it is only through chance that the 
intermediates between humans and, say cows, are extinct that we are able to see and mainta in 
them to be very separate, very distinct species. This is even true for fish, which are seen as so 
fundamentally different from humans they are not even afforded basic welfare protections 
(Animal Aid, 2013). The last common ancestor of humans and fish existed during the Devonian 
period around 400 million years ago, which although may seem like a vast amount of time are 
linked by continuous generations to both modern day humans and fish (Nakamura, et al., 2016). 
Humans, pigs, cows, chickens and fish were all therefore linked by a continuous chain of 
organisms in which none ever changed from one species to the other. Such statements may be 
criticised as speculation as they are not directly observable, however evidence of these chains 
comes from extensive fossil records and similarities between species, both physically and 
genetically (Ridley, 2004b). 
To further explain, it is worth pointing out that discontinuous thinking is not only at work when 
it comes to animals but also with regards to race. Although it is now determined that there are 
no significant biological differences between different races of humans it has often been 
thought otherwise throughout various times and places (e.g., US southern states). Following 
years of genome research it is clear that racial distinctions serve no great purpose as they are 
not indicative of significant biological differences, and in fact may be more harmful than useful 
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(Yudell, et al., 2016). In the past these perceived biological differences were used to justify 
discrimination and persecution of varying degrees. Although race can be argued to be mainly 
a social construction (Gannon, 2016), race labelling categories continue to be used as part of 
everyday life. Where the example of race differs from the case of farmed animals is that, in the 
West at least, race labelling does not in itself lead to acceptable widespread violence whereas 
species labelling does. Certain species labels are more loaded than others, such as ‘cow’, ‘pig’, 
‘chicken’ and ‘fish’; the most common of the animals consumed in the West.  These labels are 
indicative of animals that should not be ‘protected’, left to live wild or even afforded the 
comforts of basic health and daily care and seem to denote ‘use’ only.  
The main purpose in considering evolution is to highlight the closeness of species to one 
another and to show that we are in fact all branches stemming from multitudes of common 
ancestors. Therefore, if the intermediates between humans and the animals used in IAF’s were 
not dead, would farmed animals would continue to be perceived mainly as products to be bred, 
confined and consumed? In the presence of intermediates, our attempt to separate chickens 
from pigs and pigs from human would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. At the very 
least, humans would have to alter their perceptions of animals to match what evolution tells us, 
which may in turn encourage us to re-evaluate our position on the morality of subjecting them 
to the conditions of industrial farms. On the other hand, it is not just the perception of non-
human animals which evolutionary understanding may change, but that of Homo sapiens also.  
5.3 Mediocrity of man 
One of the biggest tools for justifying speciesism and hence IAF is the belief that humans are 
superior over all other species. The entitlement that humans give themselves and which most 
see as almost self-evident can be questioned under the scrutiny of evolutionary studies. 
Determining the sacredness of the human species is significant as humans are so far the only 
animal granted ‘personhood’, a status which awards legal protections to ensure such things as 
equality and freedom; there are numerous proposed attributes which may qualify a being as 
possessing personhood including rationality, relationships and autonomy (Rutkin, 2016). 
Humans are therefore not only constructed as completely unlike other species but superior, a 
privilege which seems to bestow exclusive rights.  
Despite such constructs about the position of Homo sapiens there is little evidence in 
evolutionary biology or genetics which supports the notion we are a special species in such a 
way as to justify the exploitation of members of other species. As we have seen, science has 
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informed us of the shared lineages, genetic similarities and continuous linkages between 
humans and those species subject to IAF. However, understanding evolution can also reveal 
that Homo sapiens are embedded in the ape phylogeny: humans are not descendant from apes 
or closely linked to apes, humans are apes (Dawkins, 1993). In fact, humans are members of 
the ‘great ape’ category along with chimpanzees and gorillas and, in terms of evolutionary 
time, our shared ancestor with chimpanzees lived not that long ago, approximately 6 million 
years. Even though this seems a long gulf between us and our link to chimpanzees there have 
only passed around 500,000 unbroken, interbreeding generations from our ancestor to now 
(Dawkins, 1993). According to Dawkins, at no point would there have been a moment when 
one species gave birth to another species creating ‘humans’, there was no instant when a 
monkey became a man.  In questioning at what point a human becomes an ape the boundaries 
between the traditional concepts of human and animal are blurred. Dawkins further suggests 
that if zoological labelling insists of ordering the natural world into taxonomic categories then 
there is no way to accurately remove the human species from the ‘ape’ category. This suggests 
that there is no absolute concept of ‘human-ness’ or any real basis for the unyielding ‘us’ and 
‘them’ distinction that humans draw between their own species and others.  
The difficulty of trying to define exactly what a human is and what it is not also demonstrates 
the absence of any singular human ‘essence’. Humans are defined based on what is observable 
today but we only have to acknowledge that our own species was not the only ‘type’ of human 
to ever have existed in order to call these definitions into question. The current species of 
humans from which everyone living today belongs to, Homo sapiens, have only been around 
in isolation for around 10,000 years, having lived alongside other species also belonging to the 
Homo genus (Harari, 2011). There have been at least six other species of humans to have 
inhabited the earth, including Homo soloensis, Homo erectus and Homo neanderthalensis, all 
of which went extinct not very long ago (Harari, 2011, pp. 5-9). There are also numerous 
intermediates between humans and those animals classified as apes which have been and 
continue to be discovered (e.g. Shreeve, 2015). In addition to these, it is understood that some 
hybridisation between human ‘species’ occurred, especially between Homo sapiens and Homo 
neanderthalensis with Europeans and Asians possessing between 1% to 4% Neanderthal DNA 
(Viegas, 2013). Each of the species discovered in the Homo genus resembles ‘us’ to varying 
degrees, with some looking more like the other non-human species of great apes.  
If we imagine that all of the species of human still existed and lived alongside Homo sapiens 
today or even if an extensive and complete fossil record of all these various beings were 
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amassed – what would be classed as human? It would remain to be decided where the cut off 
point for ‘human’ and ‘personhood’ are and how such a point would be decided. Would it be 
on which organisms mostly resemble Homo sapiens in appearance or in cognitive functioning? 
This question is a significant one as the answer would consequently decide who receives legal 
protection, human rights and the status of personhood, and who would be consigned to labs 
and zoos. There would be significant decisions based on arbitrary characteristics as to who 
would be classed as uniquely ‘human’ as to be afforded special treatment over all other species. 
Of course, the point here is not to say that questions about the status of Neanderthals also means 
we must necessarily do the same with regards to the status of farmed species; it is instead to 
highlight possible ambiguity present in the definition of human. In having to rethink the whole 
concept of human and what it is that is ‘unique’ about Homo sapiens we would be forced to 
see that the distinctions we make as a species are not as fixed or important as we make them 
out to be.  
In turning to science it is indeed clear that ‘speciesism has no proper basis in evolutionary 
biology’ (Dawkins, 1989, p. 142) and thus breaks down our species based excuses for the 
suffering inflicted in IAF. If we are not so set apart from the animals our species subjects to 
farming but are in fact, one of them, is it still morally acceptable to continue to use them to our 
own ends? The sense of ‘us’ and ‘other’ Homo sapiens maintain is therefore the mechanism by 
which we justify the double standards displayed in our treatment of all animals but especially 
in IAF, where not only are objections seldom heard but it seen as our ‘right’ to factory farm 
animals. That is, in perceiving humans as a superior species it encourages us to see human 
desires as more important when considering needs and interests. 
5.4 Limitations 
It has so far been shown that by paying attention to evolutionary processes, origins and genetics 
it can be deduced that humans do not possess a biological endowed special position, that they 
are in fact embedded in animal phylogeny. In observing the interconnectedness of all species 
it could be expected that to logically apply this knowledge to animal ethics would be to reject 
the act of placing animals in conditions that may cause them to suffer. However, this is not 
often the case and even those in full few of the scientific facts do not then automatically believe 
they hold moral and ethical implications. There exists instead an overall lack of engagement 
with farmed animal welfare and the morality of IAF’s by scientists and veterinarians in general 
(Siegle, 2014). This is possibly linked to the bigger issue of the separation of general science 
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and ethics, yet there appears to be a resistance within evolutionary and veterinary studies to 
really applying rational thinking to the reality of industrial farming. Richard Dawkins himse lf 
is no exception and there are a number of criticisms and limitations in his reasoning with 
regards to the application of science to the morality of IAF.  
Firstly, Dawkins seems to see no wrong in using farmed animals for their meat, eggs and milk. 
Although he expresses a desire for ‘humane slaughter’ he pays quiet acceptance to intens ive 
rearing by offering no criticism. One of the reasons Dawkins gives for subjecting animals to 
farming is the ‘obvious differences that justify us eating them’ (Dawkins, 2011). Of course, he 
is not explicitly supporting the conditions of factory farms, but to consume meat in the modern 
developed world is to almost unavoidably do so. The apparent differences that justify 
subjecting animals to farming are not disclosed by Dawkins but it is a statement which does 
not seem to support his conviction that animals can and do suffer (Dawkins, 2014 ). Although 
he provides a lot of the rationale for not subjecting animals to suffering, he does not apply this 
in any meaningful sense. Indeed, he explicitly states that pigs can clearly suffer, that humans 
are not ‘indefinitely separate from all other species’ and that our own double standards are 
arbitrary (Dawkins, 2014 ). Dawkins takes this one step further to say that understanding basic 
evolutionary implications makes it difficult to sustain speciesism (Brodie, 2004). By extension 
this would also have to mean it is difficult to morally uphold the exploitation of farmed animals.  
The best justification Dawkins provides for factory farming non-human species but not our 
own is that humans would suffer knowing that they were going to die; humans who possess the 
knowledge that they are about to be slaughtered will suffer in a way that most animals, 
assumedly, do not (Brodie, 2004). However, there are various ways that this argument can be 
broken down, the first and most obvious being that animals led to slaughter may have some 
awareness of what is happening (Hill, 1996, p. 43; Craggs, 2016). At the very least the animals 
will have some awareness of danger when faced with those conditions as nearly all organisms 
possess the basic instincts to feel fear which produces the subsequent need to flee, fight or 
freeze (Broom, 1998, p. 383). Of course it is impossible to say for sure whether farmed animals 
in slaughterhouses are fully aware of what is going to happen but considering the severity of 
the mistreatment if they do and the only downside being minor inconvenience to us, it is 
perhaps the most morally acceptable thing in this case is to assume that they do.  
Additionally, if it were determined that farmed animals had no awareness that they were to be 
killed at the end of their confinement, it does not then justify doing so. As Dawkins stressed, 
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most humans would know what was about to happen but this does not mean to suggest that it 
would therefore be acceptable to subject those humans who do not possess awareness, such as 
babies and toddlers, to similar treatment. Humans who do not possess the capacity for 
awareness of death are simply no different from Dawkins perception of farmed animals in that 
regard. Yet it would be met with widespread moral outrage to suggest that this lack of 
awareness is a good reason for doing similar things to unaware humans. A wider point worth 
making here is that given the current realities of IAF it is an almost marginal point whether 
farmed animals or humans would be able to detect their imminent deaths. The bigger issues are 
the poor conditions and confinement experienced before eventual slaughter. To draw upon such 
a small perceived difference between animals and humans is to grasp at a justification that is 
not there in light of evolutionary knowledge. It certainly makes a weak argument for dismiss ing 
the lessons of evolution and the discontinuous mind in favour of continuing to intensively farm 
certain species.  
How then, can it be acceptable to inflict such conditions upon farmed animals but not on 
humans on the basis that they are another species? Seeing no wrong in farming animals for 
food is to contradict the anti-speciesist lessons detailed. Dawkins does not take further steps to 
say evolutionary biology reveals the illegitimacy of intensively farming animals and in doing 
so holds a somewhat contradictory position or at best a position which does not apply 
evolutionary understanding to such an encompassing issue. Although Dawkins advocates 
retiring the discontinuous mind with regards to species and acknowledges that we should 
instead start thinking in terms of continuous classifications based on whether each species can 
suffer, love etc. he avoids taking that small but crucial step to linking this to the conditions in 
IAF. 
5.5 Conclusion  
The results of scientific inquiry tell us that the human need for essentialism has veiled the fact 
that we construct discreet categories in which to place animals into species which allows us to 
believe that they are inescapably different from humans. In addition, the high species status 
that humans award themselves can be partially dismantled when considering our place among 
the great apes and the existence of other forms of ‘human’. Both of these arguments are 
informed by the fact that not only are we animals with many shared origins and genetic 
compositions but that Humans as a species are not in any biologically or genetically based 
special category set apart from others. It is only through unfortunate chance that the human 
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species is able to maintain its perceptions that the world is categorised into species separated 
by such gulfs as to make it justifiable to subject them to IAF.  
However, another critical point raised by Dawkins is that giving animals the same 
consideration as humans when it comes to suffering needs more than just the knowledge that 
we share close cousinship with them (Dawkins, 1993). Dawkins therefore displays a view 
similar to Posner in that there needs to be direct evidence that animals possess the abilities that 
allow them to suffer (Singer & Posner, 2001). Most people now do not deny our evolutionary 
origins and our humble place within the phylogenetic tree. Instead, many now turn to particular 
characteristics and abilities that are considered unique to Homo sapiens in order to mainta in 
our superiority over other species, which too can be addressed by science. 
CHAPTER  6:  BIOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY  
Science can be applied to questions of animal ethics through the areas of biology and anatomy. 
One aim of this chapter is to partially answer how animals suffer in IAF as a result of conditions 
and practises (1.3), more specifically how they suffer physically through pain and discomfort. 
Part of doing this also means determining the extent to which animals feel pain and how they 
experience it which, although at first may seem unnecessary, is important to reinforce in light 
of scepticism over biological suffering in animals (Bermond, 1997; Singer & Posner, 2001). 
There will also be moral discussion around each of the practises detailed in an attempt to 
determine whether we can reasonably argue that they are acceptable.  
This chapter will begin by addressing the potential for direct pain in the practise of certain 
mutilations common to the IAF industry. It will then focus on specific aspects of the slaughter 
day that may raise concern, especially the debate around the pre-stunning of farmed animals 
and welfare implications of religious slaughter. Lastly, the role of genetic selection for  
increased yield will be assessed with regards to animal welfare. The areas of concern covered 
in the current section are far from comprehensive of all of the possible ways farmed animals 
may experience pain and suffering in IAF but it will instead focus on some of the most 
common. 
 
6.1 Pain  
Before exploring the ways in which standard IAF practises may cause pain to farmed animals 
it is first worth briefly detailing the basic biological structures that create the experience of 
32 
 
pain. According to the Oxford medical dictionary pain is ‘an unpleasant sensation ranging from 
mild discomfort to agonised distress, associated with real or potential tissue damage’ (Anon., 
2010) Pain can often be described as ‘acute’ or ‘chronic’ depending on the properties of the 
sensation being experienced. Acute pain is associated with tissue damage and is relatively short 
term pending healing, while chronic pain is more long-term and not necessarily associated with 
obvious injury or disease (Grichkin & Ferrante, 1991). The main components involved in 
nociception (pain perception) are the Central Nervous System (CNS), the peripheral neurons 
and nociceptors. In the presence of thermal, mechanical or chemical stimuli that exceed the 
threshold level of the nociceptors (noxious stimuli), electrical impulses are transmitted through 
nerves to the spinal column before reaching the brain where they are registered and felt as 
painful sensations (Dubin & Patapoutain, 2010). The last significant component relevant to 
measuring pain is cortisol; a hormone commonly released during high stress experiences 
(Society for Endocrinology, n.d).  
 
The pain system is what allows humans to feel pain on a daily basis, from cuts and burns to 
muscle cramps and headaches and, as a result of our shared ancestry, is a structure shared by 
all mammals (Broom, 2001a). This system does not just detect pain from direct and violent 
body trauma but also pain caused by discomfort and bodily stress in the joints, bones, muscles 
and in some cases, the organs. With regards to actually determining pain in non-human animals, 
measurement takes the form of three main approaches: general bodily functioning, 
physiological responses and behaviours (Weary, et al., 2006). More specific areas which can 
be subject to measurement include behaviour, physiology, brain function, immune system 
function and damage (Broom, 2008). Although there remains the issue of direct cause and 
effect between the results of these measurement and the actual experience of pain, which 
remains private, the strength of evidence from ancestry, anatomy, biological structure and 
function, and analogy (Weary, et al., 2006) more than justifies the study of pain and pain 
experiences.   
 
6.2 Mutilations 
The most common way that animals on industrial farms are potentially exposed to pain are 
through the standardised use of mutilation. Mutilations are actions that cause injury or 
disfigurement by removing or damaging parts of the body (Anon., n.d(a)). The vast majority 
of mutilations on farmed animals are usually carried out on the basis that they increase welfare, 
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though some are openly used to increase profit by aiding in efficiency and farm management 
(Pickett, et al., 2014). The main forms of mutilations covered here include castration, tail 
docking and beak trimming yet this list is not comprehensive as de-horning, teeth clipping, ear 
tags, ear notching, branding and nose rings are also common. Each of these practises causes 
direct bodily damage and should therefore be considered with regards to their potential to cause 
pain and the morality of continuing to perform them.  
 
6.2.1 Castration  
The first practise to consider is that of castration, which is carried out on most large farmed 
animals and is essentially the removal of the testicles or the elimination of their function (Rault, 
et al., 2011). The method of castration differs from animal to animal, but the methods covered 
in this section will be those most commonly used in IAF: the surgical method for piglets and 
rubber rings for calves. Surgical castration involves placing one or two incisions in the scrotum, 
removing both testicles and severing the spermatic cords which is done through either cutting, 
twisting, crushing or simply pulling (Fredriksen, et al., 2009). The procedure is almost always 
done in the absence of anaesthetic (Rault, et al., 2011, p. 216) hence piglets are subject to the 
full range of sensations that surgical castration may cause. It is therefore important to also pay 
attention to behavioural indicators of pain in castrated piglets.  
 
The most obvious behavioural evidence that piglets feel pain comes from vocalisations, 
struggle and level of activity, all of which have been shown to increase during castration (von 
Borell, et al., 2009). Vocal indicators such as increased frequency and pitch of squeals seem to 
be the strongest behavioural indictor but there is also evidence of physiological reactions; 
cortisol levels significantly increase following the procedure (Carroll, et al., 2006). The general 
scientific consensus is that piglets do experience pain caused by castration (von Borell, et al., 
2009) but it is a position that can be challenged from a methodological point of view. 
Performing castration requires high levels of direct human contact so it can be suggested that 
increased handling and the unusual situation are the real causes of any abnormal behavioura l 
responses. The strange situation piglets are placed in cannot be ignored as it is likely to cause 
them to feel stress and display fear responses which may be similar to pain responses. However, 
in order to determine if behavioural responses are a result of increased invasiveness and not a 
specific response to pain per se, a study by Taylor and Weary (2000) compared two groups of 
piglets’: one group was castrated while the other acted as a control. The control group were put 
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through the same procedure, matched in time and handing, minus actual physical castration. 
The control group showed significantly less vocalisation, suggesting that the intense reactions 
from the castrated group were indeed in response to direct bodily damage. Taylor and Weary 
were additionally able to single out the parts of the overall castration process which caused the 
most amount of pain. By measuring the frequency and amount of calling at each stage of the 
procedure it was concluded that the scrotal incision and severing were the most painful to the 
piglets.  
 
A further issue to consider when assessing the ethics of castrating piglets is that of the duration 
and consistency of pain. Since it is done at a very young age, around one to seven days old 
(CIWF, n.d(e)), it can be suggested that pain is only immediate and relatively low compared to 
if castration was performed on adult pigs, though whether this is a welfare improvement is 
questionable. Following the initial pain of the castration itself, there is some evidence that 
discomfort continues to be experienced in the long-term. Piglets have been observed to display 
pain-related behaviour such as trembling, huddling, spasms and avoiding certain sitting 
positons throughout the day of the procedure (Moya, et al., 2008) with indications that pain 
lasts into the fourth and fifth days after castration (Hay, et al., 2003). Although duration of 
castration pain has not been widely studied, pigs who have not been castrated do not engage in 
behaviour like rump scratching or tail wagging to the same degree or frequency as those who 
have (Hay, et al., 2003). The possibility that piglets continue to feel pain after the procedure 
has implications for the suggestions that welfare can be sufficiently improved in the presence 
of anaesthetic (European Commission, 2010). While this may seem like a considerable 
improvement it is likely to result in extra stress due to increased handing and the actual 
administration of the anaesthetic (Leidig, et al., 2009). This extra step will also have little 
impact on pain felt during the days following castration. Therefore castration seems to cause 
both immediate and long-term acute pain in piglets.  
 
Although many adult cows may also go through surgical castration, calves are generally subject 
to the rubber band method. This involves placing a small rubber band around the scrotum which 
acts to cut off the blood supply to the cells eventually leading to necrosis (death) and removal 
of the testicles (Capucille, et al., 2002). From an animal welfare standpoint this method may 
be preferable to the surgical method as the potential for immediate pain is obviously less. 
However, welfare may actually be worse due to duration of pain. High levels of abnormal 
behaviours such as slow tail movement, back leg stomping and head turning toward the injured 
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area can all be observed hours after the application of rubber bands and which may increase 
for up to 48 days; typically these types of behaviour are not observed in healthy cows and their 
gradual increase in cows undergoing rubber band castration correlates with increasing 
degradation of the testicles (Molony, et al., 1995). Since the removal of the testicles is not 
immediate and the potential for pain much longer, the application of anaesthetic is not as useful 
as it could be for surgical castration. Additionally, improper application of the band or 
mishandling, especially when applied by those who do not have the proper training, can lead 
to swelling, infection and haemorrhages, all of which may escalate pain and increase the 
healing time (HSUS, 2012b). Therefore pain as a result of rubber band castration seems to be 
a more chronic and enduring one relative to the surgical method and is often discouraged as an 
alternative (HSUS, 2012b, p. 3), making it no improvement from a welfare perspective. 
 
Surgical and rubber ring castration both cause high levels of distress and pain, with and without 
anaesthetic, and may lead to further health issues if done incorrectly. It would therefore only 
seem morally justified to subject any being to it if it were for another equally significant moral 
reason. To argue that castration is done for beneficial reasons, one may draw an analogy with 
the routine castration of dogs and cats in the West, which is actually endorsed as good pet 
ownership. However, the castration of companion animals differs in two ways from the 
castration of farmed animals. Cats and dogs are typically taken to a vet for a surgical castration 
where they are anaesthetised and rendered unconscious before the procedure. This is done 
presumably because it would otherwise cause pain and stress to the animal in question, a 
consideration strangely omitted when performing castration upon farmed animals. The second, 
and arguably more significant, difference concerns the underlying reasons for castration. 
Castrating companion animals is done to reduce the number of strays or unwanted litters which 
are often abandoned or simply euthanized by a vet. It is therefore done as an attempt to aid 
animal welfare and prevent needless suffering. Conversely, the castration of pigs and calves 
reduces aggression and affects the taste of the resulting meat (Rault, et al., 2011). There is 
something to be said for the argument that castration of pigs and cows aids welfare as it 
decreases aggression between the animals and hence injury from fighting, however, meat 
quality is an arguably less powerful reason for compromising welfare. Although castration is 
seen as a necessity within the industry, it is hard to argue that variation in taste is an interest 
which is equal to the one in not experiencing unnecessary pain and distresses. Overall, evidence 
suggests that castration is detrimental to welfare but is done for reasons related to profit and 




6.2.2 Tail Docking 
Another form of mutilation practised in IAF is tail docking and is performed on pigs, cows and 
sheep. Tail docking is a husbandry practise that involves removing a portion of the tail using a 
variety of methods depending on the species. Docking in calves involves removing one to two 
thirds of the tail by applying a rubber band to a joint section of the tail for approximately 3-7 
weeks or until constriction causes the tissue to die and the tail to eventually fall off (HSUS, 
2012c). In some cases the tail is manually cut off after about a week of band constriction. For 
pigs the tail is usually removed immediately using clippers, scissors or a scalpel (Sutherland & 
Tucker, 2011) and so, as with castration, is likely going to cause a high level of acute pain 
which is typical of major bodily trauma. Both are often performed without the benefit of 
anaesthetic so, again, the full range sensations caused will be experienced. 
 
The strongest evidence for determining the presence of tail docking pain comes from a range 
of behavioural indicators. Behavioural responses can be compared and contrasted between 
animals who have undergone the procedure and those who have not. In general, cows 
experiencing discomfort tend to adopt a more static posture and engage in less movement than 
those who are healthy, with cows who have undergone tail docking often displaying the former 
(HSUS, 2012c, p. 2). More specifically, those cows who undergo rubber ring amputation show 
a tendency to keep the injured tail pressed close to their bodies, perhaps indicating that any 
pain is exasperated by movement (Tom, et al., 2002). Conversely, pain in pigs has been found 
to be associated with an increase in particular movements, such as tail wagging and flick ing 
behaviours (Sutherland, et al., 2008). Of course behavioural observations can come under 
scrutiny as a method when attempting to determine the impact of tail docking as the strange 
sensation from the sudden loss of an appendage may in fact be the real cause of increased 
activity in that area. If pain were not present then it could be expected that in most others ways 
a piglet’s behaviour would not differ significantly from those not tail docked. Yet, a study by 
Sutherland et al. (2008) has shown that not only do docked pigs display increased flicking and 
tail-to-body pressing but that they also avoid sitting in positions which would cause contact 
with the tail stump. Additionally, the same vocal indicators seen in pigs subject to castration 
were also observed during tail docking but which differed significantly from piglet control 
groups who were handled only (Noonan, et al., 1994; Marchant-Forde, et al., 2009). 
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Behavioural evidence seems to support that pigs and cows experience pain from the immed ia te 
sensations caused by tail amputation. 
  
Other than the immediate pain caused by the procedure itself it is also worth noting that tail 
docking can lead to other forms of discomfort such as the development of infections, increased 
sensitivity of the tail stump (neuroma) and, in cows, irritation caused by the inability to swipe 
away flies (Sutherland & Tucker, 2011). Additionally there is also the potential for docked 
farmed animals to experience phantom limbs, a discomfort often felt by humans who have lost 
a limb or an appendage. There has in fact been some research which directly indicates that the 
role of the stumped tail and its effects upon the body with regards to phantom sensations are 
very similar to ones observed in human amputees (Eicher, et al., 2006), which includes 
sensations and pain where the lost limb should be (Jensen, et al., 1983). These additiona l 
consequences imply that not only is tail docking painful while it is performed but can 
potentially inflict long-term suffering in the form of increased sensitivity and negative 
sensations.  
 
There has been research in recent years which not only points to the welfare issues related to 
tail docking but also to the absence of any real benefits of it (Stull, et al., 2002). Considering 
that the evidence indicates tail docking causes both short and long term pain it must thus be 
considered with regards to animal welfare and whether it is necessary. Tail docking in dairy 
cows is carried out for a number of reasons such as ease for the farmers, cleanliness and to 
reduce the risk of mastitis (Stull, et al., 2002). On the other hand, pigs have their tails docked 
in order to reduce aggressive tail biting which may lead to injury, infection or even cannibalism 
(Sutherland & Tucker, 2011). Although the reasons given for tail docking are stronger and 
more numerous that those given for castration, ultimately they all come down to housing 
conditions. For cows, tail docking is about cleanliness while pigs are docked to minimise the 
effects of aggression but both of these issues may be caused by inadequate conditions on 
factory farms. The close confinement, barren environments and high stress that pigs are subject 
to are the main causes of aggression in the first place, while cows are subject to poor sanitation 
and improper care. The underlying issues are thus left unaddressed while tail docking is 
performed simply to minimise some of the worse effects of these issues. The question remains 
then whether it is morally correct to perform a painful procedure simply to minimise the effects 
of issues caused by poor welfare as opposed to taking measures to improve conditions and raise 
welfare in the first place. In the case of tail docking, welfare does seem to be of minimal 
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importance and as it does not seem a completely necessary practise or justified over benefits to 
the animals themselves, the moral acceptability of tail docking is thus highly questionable. 
 
6.2.3 Beak Trimming 
Mutilations on industrial farms are not just confined to pigs and cattle as one of the most 
common mutilations is beak trimming (sometimes called beak amputation or de-beaking). The 
vast majority of chickens have part of their beaks cut away when they are young with many 
flocks undergoing additional trimming later in life due to the potential for full or partial 
regrowth. Trimming is typically carried out by inserting the chick into a machine where a hot 
blade is used to cut away and cauterise a certain amount of the beak (Glatz, 2000). The question 
as to whether chicks feel any pain during this procedure can be debated because the beak itself 
is not made of soft tissue, hence tempting the belief that they can be fully compared to hair or 
nails. However, not far in from the tip of the beak are soft tissue layers which contain blood 
vessels and nerve endings (Kuenzel, 2007), structures which are almost always damaged during 
beak trimming. The complexity and the abundance of nerves present in the beak demonstrate 
that they are far from insensitive to pain and should therefore be given the same consideration 
as any other body part when contemplating the effects of mutilations. 
 
Researchers who have studied the effects of beak trimming on chickens have not only observed 
the difference in behaviour between chickens who have and have not had the procedure but 
also the changes between before and after the procedure. As can be expected from chickens 
experiencing pain in their beaks, those who had been trimmed engaged in less feeding, 
drinking, pecking and preening in the long-term (Glatz, 2000, p. 10). This raises the question 
as to whether chickens feel chronic pain which continues after the immediate procedure. 
Studies aiming to determine this have generally found mixed results with some research 
showing that chickens with trimmed beaks display a marked reduction in beak use, head 
movement and general activity which can be observed for two weeks after the procedure 
(Gentle, et al., 1997) with evidence that significant pain related behaviour persists for up to six 
weeks (Gentle, et al., 1990). Although the reduction of beak use in trimmed chickens may seem 
at first to be an obvious indication that beak use causes pain due to damaged tissue and 
increased sensitivity, it can also be speculated that such behaviours are caused by the loss of 
the beak itself. As with tail docking, any abnormal behaviour related to the amputated area may 
just be a response to the strange sensation of loss and not a reaction to pain per se. However, 
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the fact that an overall decrease in activity and movement is a more general indication of 
chronic pain in many animals, including chickens, (National Research Council (US), 2009) 
indicates that pain was a significant factor.  
 
The age at which beak trimming occurs may also affect the experience of pain and so be an 
important consideration when assessing if it is morally acceptable. Studies done on chicks who 
undergo beak trimming at only a few days old have found that they do not display pain or 
avoidance related behaviour in the time immediately following the procedure (Gentle, 2011, p. 
253). Such an effect may be either due to quicker healing and beak regeneration or possibly 
because the blade does not reach as far into the nerved area of the beak as it would in adult 
chickens. The possibility that very young chicks do not feel any discomfort after the procedure 
and are able to quickly recover relative to older chickens is a strong argument for ensuring beak 
trimming is done at preferably no more than 2-3 days old. Even so, there are other potential 
welfare concerns beyond acute and chronic pain as suffering can be caused by a decreased 
ability to feed effectively, if at all. In many cases chickens who have had their beaks trimmed 
lose weight as a result and, although less engagement in feeding behaviour as a direct response 
to pain may be one possible explanation, there is some evidence that this is not necessarily the 
main cause for weight loss. A study by Gentle et al. (1982) found that de-beaked hens did 
engage in feeding behaviours and made active effort to consume food but were prevented from 
effectively doing so due to the unpractical and unfamiliar shape of their beaks. Therefore 
although the welfare of chicks may not be compromised after the procedure with regards to 
pain the high potential beak trimming has to lead to long-term hunger, stress and weakness 
does create moral concern.  
 
The evidence for absence of beak pain in young chicks coupled with the justifications for 
performing this specific mutilation in the first place can perhaps provide a strong moral 
argument for its continuation. Many in the egg and chicken industry believe that carrying out 
beak trimming in their flocks actually leads to better animal welfare (Glatz, 2000). Pecking 
between birds is fairly common and can therefore often lead to severe feather loss, injury and 
cannibalism (Jendral & Robinson, 2004). Within the specific context of IAF’s it seems to be 
more beneficial to chicken welfare to trim their beaks as opposed to not doing so, especially if 
it is done so at a very young age. There are however, additional factors to consider within this 
debate. It must first be remembered that even if there is no pain following amputation and 
recovery for chicks is fast, this still does not dismiss the intense pain likely to be felt during the 
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actual procedure. As described earlier, the anatomy of a chick’s beak leaves little doubt that 
removal without anaesthetic would stimulate similar pain responses as removing any other 
body part. Beak trimming does therefore cause pain and distress in at least one way with the 
potential for further stressful consequences. Given this, to render beak trimming morally 
justifiable it would have to be the last resort for avoiding injurious pecking. Unfortunately this 
is most often not the case as this type of aggressive behaviour is caused by a combination of 
stress, frustration and unnatural environments (Bowles, et al., 2015). Chickens kept in higher 
welfare conditions that provide more space, lighting and monitoring, have been shown to 
engage in less injurious pecking and aggression, even with intact beaks (Bowles, et al., 2015). 
The fact that chickens with intact beaks can be kept without compromising their health makes 
the welfare argument for beak trimming a hard one to maintain. The ability to spare chickens 
the pain and stress of amputation and possible hunger by simply improving conditions means 
using beak trimming in place of this cannot be concluded to be morally defensible.  
 
Overall, although there are a number of both farming and welfare benefits to the mutilations of 
castration, tail docking and beak trimming, they also have the potential to cause acute and 
chronic pain, distress, infection and injury when undertaken. The negative effects upon animal 
welfare coupled with reasoning which indicates that they are practises which are neither 
necessary nor justified means mutilations are therefore not a morally acceptable part of IAF.  
 
6.3 The slaughter process 
Animals raised in the IAF industry have greatly reduced lifespans in comparison to their natural 
life expectancy as, even in the absence of premature death by disease, injury etc., they are sent 
to slaughter relatively early in their lives. To demonstrate, the average cow’s life expectancy 
is approximately 15-20 years yet those used to produce milk are killed at 4 years old and those 
used for meat, ‘beef’ cows, at around 18 months. Pigs have a natural lifespan of 10-12 years 
and a chicken 8 years but which are slaughtered at 6 months and 5-7 weeks respectively 
(AussieAbattoirs, n.d). Once sent to slaughter there are a number of possible areas of welfare 
concern throughout the slaughter process including food deprivation, rough handling, injury, 
heat stroke (Terlouw, et al., 2008), use of electric prods and stress conditions such as fatigue 
syndrome (Thomson, et al., 2015). However, only a few issues will be addressed here starting 
with common slaughter methods and the welfare consequences of ineffective slaughter. The 
second section will handle the debate around the pre-stunning of animals and religious 
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The question of whether farmed animals experience pain during slaughter is an obvious one 
when it comes to ethics and animal agriculture. This question is referring to the definition of 
slaughter as given by the Oxford dictionary as ‘the killing of animals for food’ (Stevenson, 
2010). The methods of slaughter differ across species but remain fairly consistent across 
industrial farms, particularly in the West. Slaughter can be assessed in terms of welfare, and 
thus morality, by paying attention to 1) the presence of pain and 2) the time it takes for 
unconsciousness and death to occur.  
 
Pigs are typically killed through a method called ‘sticking’ which is the penetration of the chest 
and heart with a long knife. Pain during sticking can mainly be measured by the efficiency with 
which it is carried out (Brandt & Aaslyng, 2015) but if done correctly, is justified on welfare 
grounds as it produces rapid loss of consciousness thus decreasing the length of time pain can 
be felt. Consequently, ‘sticking’ can be argued to be more ethical than alternatives such as blunt 
head trauma or throat incisions. Pigs do not have particularly prominent throats in comparison 
to other species so attempting to slaughter them by neck incision would run the risk of improper 
severance of key veins making it both unreliable and likely to cause prolonged suffering. The 
administration of blunt head trauma would also raise too many ethical questions due to the 
unreliable effect of human administered impact, making the possibility of waking during the 
next stage both high and unpredictable. However, the relatively high ethical standing of 
sticking as a slaughter method is dependent upon the quality of the procedure, which can be 
assessed by paying attention to levels of consciousness. Factors that effect the quality of 
sticking include the length of the blade, longer blades induce faster blood loss (Anil, et al., 
2000), and skill of the slaughterer. A post mortem study by Anil et al. (2000) supports the 
significance of these factors as it was found that in many pigs the knife had penetrated only 
some of the key structures needed to induce rapid blood loss. The welfare implications of these 
results are that it can take a while after the incision for pigs to die or lose consciousness. There 
is in fact evidence that over 1% of pigs regain consciousness a full three minutes after sticking 
(Troeger, et al., 2005). Since slow loss of consciousness or the regaining of conscious 
compromises welfare it can instead be argued that this method has just as much potential to 
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cause suffering as the ‘less ethical’ alternatives, suggesting there may be no entirely ethical 
way to slaughter pigs.  
 
On the other hand, due to the mechanical way chickens are slaughtered human error is perhaps 
less of an ethical issue than in pigs. Chickens are typically hung inverted and passed over an 
automatic blade which severs their throats. However, the effectiveness of this method is still 
dependent upon the successful severing of certain vessels, mainly the carotid and jugular; birds 
whose carotid artery had not been severed successfully took longer to lose consciousness and 
die, a state which sometimes persisted for up to 180 seconds after incision (Cranley, 2017). 
The main reasons chickens may be subject to high chances of improper slaughter are the high 
processing numbers and aversive movements which compromise the efficiency of the blade. 
In many factories, improper slaughter is so frequent that workers are assigned to manually cut 
the throat of any birds who have avoided the blade (Raj, 2010, p. 269). Therefore, even when 
using slaughter methods with little chance of human error there is still danger of slow loss of 
consciousness and thus danger to welfare.   
 
It can be argued that if pigs and chickens do experience pain upon slaughter, the current 
methods widely employed are still the most efficient possible so any pain experienced is kept 
to a minimal. It is true that there are many ways in which farmed animals can be killed in IAF 
which are worse for welfare than those recommended but at this point it is important to take a 
closer look at some of the realities of slaughter in IAF. The potential for botched slaughter 
mentioned previously is incredibly high: the high number of animals which have to be 
processed each day in most factories means little time and attention is given to each individua l 
animal to ensure proper slaughter. In addition to the studies just mentioned, information from 
both the logistics of slaughterhouse processing times and from worker accounts indicate that it 
is common that animals are not ‘stuck’ or ‘cut’ effectively or are missed out altogether, so go 
on to the next part of the process alive and conscious (Warrick, 2001; Eisnitz, 2007). The 
consequences of this are particularly high because the next stage of the process for pigs and 
chickens is immersion in scalding tanks; vats of high temperature water designed to loosen hair 
or feathers (FAO, n.d(b)). Both may therefore be submerged in scalding water while still alive 
and conscious, which can be determined through physical reactions like thrashing and kicking 




Consequently, even though sticking and neck incision are the methods that in themselves 
ensure the highest level of welfare at slaughter, their practice still creates serious costs for the 
animals involved. Problems with speed and worker inefficiency are particular features of 
industrial agricultural systems where high output and low costs are vital, but that is not to say 
that they justified. In going back to the idea of basic moral truths (Harris, 2010b), low welfare 
during slaughter already makes IAF slaughter processes morally questionable. If the issue were 
to be contemplated further using moral reasoning, they can also be deemed unnecessary. 
Continued agricultural intensification, producer demands and the presence of unskilled 
workers (Hutchinson, 2014; Food Empowerment Project, n.d) means the frequency of 
improper slaughter is likely to continue to increase, yet it can be argued that adequate training 
of workers and less intense production goals would allow for the potential to create better 
conditions such as more attention given to each animal. Although such an outcome is not 
guaranteed, these compromises are relatively small when considering the moral implicat ions  
on welfare of not doing. It could be countered that high processing and low costs are necessary 
in order to keep up with demand, yet such an argument is an anthropocentric one. To hold this 
view is to suggest that the preference for cheap and plentiful meat, eggs and dairy holds higher 
importance over the potential of prolonged suffering in other species. Showing that welfare is 
compromised to such a degree coupled with the conclusion that it is unnecessary supports 
indications that IAF is not morally acceptable.  
 
6.3.2 Pre-stunning and religious slaughter 
The vast majority of industrial farms use pre-stunning techniques which are meant to render 
animals unconscious before they are slaughtered, consequently alleviating them from 
experiencing pain or distress. Unfortunately, pre-stunning can be ineffective in rendering 
animals unconscious and can instead be a direct cause of pain. For example, evidence indicates 
that death or stunning of pigs using CO2 poisoning is painful (Conlee, et al., 2005), creates 
feelings of asphyxia (Becerill-Herrera, et al., 2009) and may also allow for the recovery of 
consciousness (Hartung, et al., 2002). The pre-stunning method considered most humane 
across all farmed animals is the application of electricity to the head, intended to induce 
generalised epilepsy thus causing little to no pain (Raj, 2006, p. 468; Farouk, 2013, p. 809). 
However, that this method only causes a painless seizure has been subject to some doubt with 
research indicating that it may cause pain, anxiety and fractures, and can be likened to the 
experience of electroconvulsive therapy (Zivotofsky & Strous, 2012). Electric stunning is a 
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particular problem when used on chickens as there are indications that in up to one third of 
cases the voltage used is not enough to induce unconsciousness (Boyd, 1994), while in the US 
chickens are exempt for the Humane Slaughter Act and so are only temporarily paralysed by 
the shock, not anesthetised (Gregory, 1986). On the other hand, in many cases religious 
restrictions mean pre-stunning is not performed at all, a practise which sparks debate over 
animal welfare.  
 
Considering the grave welfare problems that may occur with pre-stunning, the argument is 
whether religious non-stunning slaughter is therefore a more humane alternative to 
conventional slaughter processes. As both the Islamic and Jewish faiths allow for the 
consumption of cows for meat, the slaughter of cows will mainly be discussed for the purposes 
of this debate. Slaughter according to the rules of Halal (Muslim) and Kosher (Jewish) must be 
done through venereal neck incision which must severe the major veins and blood vessels in 
one continuous cut (Farouk, 2013). The rules of Kosher do not allow for any form of pre-
stunning while Halal does allow the use of methods which have zero chance of killing the 
animal prematurely; Halal slaughter therefore requires the animals alive while Kosher requires 
them both alive and conscious. The Jewish and Islamic faiths argue that animals slaughtered 
following the rules of the religion suffer less than those pre-stunned as throat incision quickly 
diverts blood from the brain causing rapid loss of consciousness (Farouk, 2013). In fact, Halal 
slaughter is argued to cause immediate anesthetisation and therefore cause no pain to animals 
(Department of Halal Certification, n.d), a statement supported by some evidence which 
suggested that if carried out correctly, cows show little to no behavioural response following 
incision (Grandin & Regenstein, 1994).  
On the other hand, much research has been conducted to determine the level of welfare at 
slaughter. Gregory et al. (2012) examined scientific studies on religious slaughter in cattle and 
found that a number of welfare issues may occur including delay in collapse and consciousness, 
slowed bleeding due to false aneurism, and blood in the respiratory tract. Frequent 
complications in bleed out mean that animals may take a significant amount of time to lose 
consciousness, ranging from twenty seconds to four minutes (Gregory, et al., 2012) with 14% 
of cattle standing up again following the first collapse (Gregory, et al., 2010). The findings of 
these studies counter the statement that the methods of religious slaughter are more humane 
because they cause fast loss of consciousness. Slow loss of consciousness after slaughter is a 
high welfare risk as it may cause mental stress, pain and respiratory distress (Gregory, et al., 
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2012). With regards to respiratory distress, the issue occurs because animals that are not pre-
stunned continue to breathe afterwards, meaning they may suffer irritation and blockage in the 
lungs and airways from blood (Gregory, et al., 2010). A study by (Agbeniga & Webb, 2012) 
compared the levels of blood splash in various parts of the respiratory system between kosher 
and conventionally slaughter animals; it was found that at all stages blood levels were much 
higher in the kosher slaughtered animals, for example 65% of kosher animals but only 0.7% of 
pre-stunned animals had blood splash in the lungs. The main welfare problem with this is that 
there is a high chance it causes unpleasant sensory sensation, including stress and panic, as 
animals try to breathe (Gregory, et al., 2012). Despite the claim of immediate anesthetisat ion, 
there has been little research into the pain aspect of religious slaughter. One notable exception 
by Gibson et al. (2009), performed EEG scans on claves as they were slaughtered and found 
that electrical signals corresponding to pain were active following slaughter and up until they 
lost consciousness, which was not immediate. When stunning was carried out either before or 
after slaughter the pain signals stopped, leading the authors to conclude that pain is felt in non-
stunning slaughter.  
Opinions on how long it takes for consciousness to fade therefore seem to differ between 
immediately (See Department of Halal Certification, n.d; Nakyinsige, et al., 2013) and, as 
detailed above, a significant amount of time. These discrepancies may come down to 
methodological and procedural issues. However, even if the evidence did strongly indicate 
immediate loss of consciousness and a complete absence of pain when performed correctly, 
the Kosher and Halal meat industries are still billion dollar businesses (Farouk, 2013) and as a 
result, the animals subject to it are still processed on an industrial scale as they are in 
conventional slaughterhouses. As in conventional slaughterhouses, slaughter may not be 
carried out to an ideal standard, where mistakes and oversights will occur. Malpractice 
observed in religious slaughterhouses include the use of blunted knives, improper throat 
cutting, stressful restraint and animals hoisted up by one leg while fully conscious (Nakyinsige, 
et al., 2013). Therefore due to the nature of IAF it can be suggested that welfare is likely to be 
compromised regardless of the debate over which method is most humane.  
 
Evidence overall seems to indicate that religious slaughter does not seem to provide a more 
humane alternative to conventional slaughter. The majority of scientific studies carried out on 
the topic show that farmed animals are affected by pain and distress when slaughtered in the 
absence of pre-stunning and in many cases welfare may be lower than in conventional systems; 
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it should therefore be asked whether slaughter in the absence of pre-stunning is a necessary 
practise. The blood of non-stunned animals is thought to drain better than those that have been 
stunned, making the meat cleaner and therefore in line with religious requirements which state 
that no blood should be left in the carcass (Coghlan, 2009; Department of Halal Certificat ion, 
n.d). However, this assumption has been questioned by research which demonstrated that the 
bleed out of cattle who were stunned showed no significant difference from those who were 
not (Anil, et al., 2006), casting doubt upon the necessity for conscious slaughter. Regardless of 
whether bleed out is better or not, it is doubtful as to whether religious beliefs are an adequate 
justification. Based on the evidence that religious slaughter does significantly affect animal 
welfare, it can be questioned whether risking high levels of suffering is on balance with the 
need for religious preferences regarding food. In line with the utilitarian principle of overall 
benefit, avoiding potential pain, mental stress and respiratory distress of perhaps millions of 
animals can be seen to far outweigh most other needs, meaning religious slaughter does not 
pose a morally acceptable alternative to pre-stunning.   
 
6.4 Genetic engineering  
Genetic engineering in itself far from inherently bad but with specific regards to industria l 
farming, genetic manipulation has traditionally only been done to aid productivity and profit 
with little attention to animal welfare (Greger, 2010). Some of the ways farmed animal have 
been genetically engineered include selection for rapid growth and high mass, decreased 
aggression, leaner meat, and improved reproduction potential (NCBI, 2002). However, one of 
the most significant roles the development and use of genetic engineering has played in IAF 
has been the increase in yield. 
 
6.4.1 Yield  
While genetic manipulation is carried out on all farmed animals, including those produced for 
meat, selection with regards to breeding in female animals effects both the females themselves 
and the offspring produced. Genetic selection in sows has led to increased leanness of the 
mother, less nutritional milk, larger litter sizes and, consequently, an increased piglet mortality 
rate (HSUS, 2009), yet there are a number of features of creating high yield in hens and dairy 
cows that are unique. This section will thus assess welfare and morality with regards to yield 




Less than one hundred years ago an average hen laid around 100 eggs per year yet in industria l 
farms genetic selection has led to an average of 300 eggs per hen per year (HSUS, n.d). The 
development of eggs relies on having sufficient calcium within the body, if output is too high 
the ‘reservoir’ of calcium within a hens bones is depleted, leading to the development of 
osteoporosis (Riddell, 1992). Observations have shown that approximately 70% of laying hens 
have osteoporosis (D’Silva & Stevenson, 1995) due to calcium deficiency. Although it is not 
considered to be painful in itself it still has welfare implications as it weakens bones making 
them increasingly prone to breakages (HSUS, n.d). Evidence of osteoporosis in hens comes 
from the high level of fractured and broken bones in chickens at various stages of the 
production and slaughter process; 16-25% of hens experience broken bones during removal 
from cages, 31% during transport and shacking (HSUS, n.d, p. 2) and over 40% have keel bone 
fractures at some point (Sandilands, et al., 2005). It is hard to accurately determine whether 
chickens feel pain from broken or fractured bones as there has been a marked absence of studies 
examining this, but Gentle (2011) states that the anatomical, biochemical and physiologica l 
mechanisms of pain are shared between birds and humans to the extent that pain experiences 
from broken bones in humans can be inferred to be similar in chickens. Additional welfare 
issues caused by abnormally frequent egg laying include infections, tumours and prolapses, all 
of which can lead to premature death (Keshavarz, 1990). High density and the absence of 
appropriate nesting areas often means hens may also peck at the prolapses and wounds leading 
to further injury, cannibalism, infections and haemorrhages (HSUS, n.d). As a result there are 
very high welfare costs to increasing egg productivity to such a degree, a pattern which is not 
just limited to hens.  
 
Dairy cows are selectively bred to produce much more milk than is natural, just in the last 40 
years alone the average milk yield per cow has doubled (Oltenacu & Broom, 2010) with cows 
in the UK and US producing 22 and 30 litres per day respectively (CIWF, n.d(b)). Doubt over 
the suitability of a cow’s body to cope with the uneven resource allocation this causes (Broom, 
2009) is supported by correlations between high milk yield and an increased risk of 
reproductive problems, lameness and infections such as mastitis (Broom, 2001b). Mastitis 
effects around 30% of cows with some studies indicating an incidence of up to 71 cases per 
100 cows (Animal Aid, n.d(c)) and is generally characterised by udder swelling, redness, heat 
and abnormalities in the milk such as clots or pus (AHDB, n.d). Consequently, moderate to 
severe mastitis is considered to be painful and may cause a number of symptoms detrimenta l 
to welfare such as diarrhoea, dehydration, lessened appetite and decreased mobility due to 
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udder pain and sensitivity (AHDB, n.d). Additionally, the repeated cycle of insemination, 
pregnancy, birth and lactation has a more general effect upon a cow’s body; dairy cows are 
usually killed at around 5 years old, after 3-4 lactation cycles, as it is at this point that their 
yield and health begin to wane. That is, resources used in the body to maintain general health 
are instead redirected towards the production of abnormally high levels of milk, causing poor 
health such as malnutrition, starvation and decreased longevity (Oltenacu & Broom, 2010). 
Broom has thus done extensive research into genetic selection for high milk yield (e.g. Broom, 
2001b; Broom, 2009; Oltenacu & Broom, 2010), by measuring physiological response and 
observations for behavioural abnormality, and consistently found that the problems mentioned 
all negatively affect cow welfare.  
 
Genetic manipulation for high yields of milk and eggs is very closely linked to surplus 
offspring. Given that a cow must be pregnant in order for her body to produce milk, the dairy 
industry is dependent upon the birth of offspring to create and maintain high levels of 
production. Females born this way will be used for milk production while the males may be 
sold for meat or killed because they do not produce enough meat to be worth raising (Animal 
Aid, n.d(c)). The egg industry also creates billions of surplus male chicks per year in its 
endeavour to breed hens for eggs. Almost all are disposed of as soon as they hatch; in the UK 
recommended methods include CO2 gassing or quick maceration in shredding machines 
(RSPCA, 2016). Maceration is considered the most humane as gassing may leave chicks alive 
for up to two minutes after administration and, as mentioned in the previous section on pre-
stunning prior to slaughter, death by CO2 poisoning may be both painful and distressing in pigs 
(Becerill-Herrera, et al., 2009) which, given shared physiology, is likely to create similar 
responses in chickens. Distress during this process can also be seen through the presence of 
behaviours that are indicative of discomfort such as gasping and head shaking (RSPCA, 2016). 
Although the science behind all of these methods cannot be examined here they often do not 
result in immediate or painless death and so cannot be considered humane by any welfare 
standards.  
 
In the egg and dairy industries, increasing productivity and thus the potential for welfare 
problems seems to be on the rise (Gurian-Sherman, 2008; HSUS, n.d), making genetic selection 
an area that needs urgent attention to prevent worsening impact on welfare. There exists a 
tension between the fact that science can be used to highlight and inform upon biologica l 
suffering caused by genetic engineering and the fact that it is scientific research which has 
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made genetic engineering possible. None of this is to say that genetic manipulation in farmed 
animals is always directly detrimental to welfare. For instance, advancements in breeding pigs 
resistant to certain viruses has reduced pig mortality from diseases which, taken in isolation, is 
a significant improvement in welfare (NCBI, 2002). However, this advancement has allowed 
for an increase in animal density and intensification. One way to consider this development 
from a moral standpoint is to look at the reasons for such high incidence of disease in the first 
place; poor conditions and sanitation alongside confinement leads to sickness which can then 
be rapidly spread from pig to pig. The development of pigs who are more resistant to such 
viruses allows both producers and farmers to ignore the fundamental problems in conditions 
and thus ignore additional welfare issues such conditions cause. It can thus be suggested that 
genetic manipulations in farmed animals rarely benefit the welfare of the animals involved and 
in fact often directly results in poor welfare. This statement is particularly applicable with 
regards to traits selected for yield which is done purely for productivity and ultimately profit 
(Greger, 2010; D’Silva & Stevenson, 1995). Even in the absence of conclusive evidence of the 
biological consequences of genetic manipulation, can it be said to be morally correct to 
sacrifice welfare in exchange for productivity? Given the environmental costs of such intens ive 
production (see 3.2.1) and the amount of produce currently wasted in the West (Lipinski, et al., 
2013) in addition to problems of animal welfare, it is difficult to argue such an exchange is 
morally reasonable.  
 
6.5 Conclusion  
It seems that for the practices mentioned in this chapter, evidence indicates that farmed animals 
do feel pain and are subject to low welfare as a result. Research into both physiological and 
behavioural indicators of pain have suggested that direct pain is caused by mutilations such as 
castration, tail docking and beak trimming. The potential for acute pain and distress is also 
particularly high during slaughter due to either improper administration or the absence of pre-
stunning techniques. Despite the claim that kosher and halal slaughter is more humane than in 
conventional slaughterhouses, evidence into welfare at the time of slaughter does not seem to 
support this. More indirect forms of pain and discomfort exist as a result of genetic selection 
issues as, although genetic selection can have benefits to farmed animals welfare, the priority 




Thus the need for scientific evidence on the biological capacities of animals to physically suffer 
expressed by the likes of Posner (Singer & Posner, 2001) and Bermond (1997 ) is in fact 
present. The current chapter has attempted to present some of this work and has in turn found 
indications that all of the practices discussed have varying levels of impact upon the welfare 
on the animals they are done to. Although how much pain and distress is caused cannot be 
conclusively determined, it can still be seen that welfare is compromised to at least some 
degree. Therefore to render the continuation of these practices morally acceptable there would 
have to be a clear, justifiable reasons to do so. Unfortunately, many of the practices specified 
throughout this chapter, such as disease, stress and injuries, can potentially be avoided through 
improvements to conditions. Although a decrease in demand may cause a decrease in 
intensification which in turn may aid the creation of conditions of higher welfare, this is far 
from certain. Decreased demand may mean less animals are subject to IAF but those that still 
remain may be no better off. Such as possibility and the fact that better conditions do not 
completely eliminate welfare issues (slaughter, forced breeding etc. would still remain) means 
the best current solution, beyond complete elimination of animal products, may lie in active 
effort to place a greater focus on animal welfare across all IAF systems.  
 
On the other hand, it would seem that instead of accepting that the conditions and practices 
placed upon animals are detrimental to their welfare and taking action to change this, effort 
seems directed towards simply alleviating physiological discomfort directly. Most effort is with 
treating those symptoms which have a knock on effect on productivity and not on the causes 
of the symptoms themselves. This is a pattern not only seen in producers and farmers but one 
which is present throughout the scientific literature also (e.g. Kansas State University, 2014; 
Elliott, 2014). Physiological discomfort which does not have an impact upon productivity is 
often ignored while any literature that does concern itself with welfare directly is often worded 
so as to propose a benefit to producers (e.g. Warnick, et al., 2001; Ferguson & Warner, 2008). 
However, with an increased awareness of the potential farmed animals have to suffer and the 
lack of moral reasons for the conditions of IAF, it can be hoped that physical welfare can 
become a cause for concern in itself and thus invite more direct study and effort to create 
change. Nevertheless, physical factors are not the only dimension to consider when assessing 
the conditions of farmed animals; the ability to experience mental distress is also important to 




CHAPTER  7:  PSYCHOLOGY  
Marian Stamp Dawkins states that when it comes to changing people’s perceptions regarding 
animal ethics and morals, four key features must be demonstrated: the first two are that animals 
can feel pain and are aware of it and its causes, the third is the ability to demonstrate 
cleverness/thinking while the fourth concerns full consciousness on the same level as humans 
(Dawkins, 1993, p. 6). The last three features relate to psychological based abilities and are the 
main focus of this chapter which aims to determine if and how animals psychologically suffer 
in IAF, through using reasoning, and whether any effects upon welfare are morally acceptable. 
The main focus is therefore upon psychological welfare which can be summarised as the 
absence of negative feelings such as fear and frustration, but may also include the presence of 
positive feelings or ‘pleasure’ (Duncan, 2005). It is thus an important debate regarding the 
principle of equal consideration of interests and, consequently, the morality of IAF.  
The importance of using scientific theory and research when discussing the psychology and 
psychological health of animals goes someway to avoiding the criticism of anthropomorphism; 
the attribution of human characteristics to non-human things, in this case non-human species. 
Objective measurement from scientific research can counter personal projections that may 
occur when discussing particularly subjective psychological dimensions. Therefore, the 
assumptions here are not ones of anthropomorphism, nor are they of complete and unbridgeab le 
difference, but are instead somewhere in between. This discussion therefore operates on the 
assumptions that other animals are both psychologically very different but also very similar to 
humans. The chapter will be split into three sections: emotion, cognition, and consciousness. 
Each section will assess which dimensions of these abilities exits in animals, how they can play 
a role in awareness and suffering and if they therefore effect welfare in IAF.  
7.1 Emotions 
Physiologically, emotions are electrical and neuro-chemical activity in the autonomic nervous 
system (ANS) and the brain. Although not fully agreed upon, basic emotions more or less 
consist of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise (Ekman, 1992), but more 
complex emotions such as distrust, contempt, guilt and grief also exist. The question of whether 
non-human animals have emotions has particular importance for the welfare of animals in IAF, 
as emotions are one of the core factors for the experience of positive and negative feelings. 
This section will thus start by examining the evidence around whether non-human animals 
possess emotions before moving onto how they may play an important role on animal welfare 
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in IAF. The section will end with a moral and critical debate around emotional welfare in 
industrially farmed animals.  
7.1.1 Emotions in animals 
Unlike other species, we as humans can determine emotions are present by communica t ing 
how we feel through spoken language; however, spoken language is not the only way emotions 
can be communicated and in the absence of this, cues can instead be taken from actions and 
behaviour. As seen in the previous chapter, abnormal behaviour and behavioural change is a 
frequent measure of pain and physical discomfort, but it can also indicate the presence of 
emotional experience in animals. Evidence of emotions through behavioural change can 
arguably be seen most strongly in manifestations of sadness or grief.  There are many cases of 
significant behavioural changes in animals dealing with the death of another and who seem to 
be affected by grief (Bekoff, 2009), including chimpanzees, who display tailored reactions 
depending their relationship to the deceased (van Leeuwen, et al., 2016). Dolphins also seem 
to engage in mourning behaviours following the death of a pod member or a calf (Hooper, 
2011). Behavioural observations thus seem to indicate that in some species at least, something 
more than nothing is present, particularly with regards to the emotional elements of death.  
Further demonstrations of emotion beyond behavioural observation can be seen in what 
animals prefer to do or not do when given the choice. According to Dawkins (1993), one 
important aspect of emotion is that something matters to us, indicated through preferences and 
interests which can be communicated through behaviour. Preference tests therefore simply 
measure what an organism choses to do when given options for certain variables (e.g. Blom, et 
al., 1992). Although preference tests tell us that something matters, and that there are perhaps 
some negative and positive emotions attached these interests, the actual strength of those 
emotions can be revealed further by how much it costs to achieve a certain thing; it is speculated 
that the further a being is willing to go to achieve something, the higher it is valued.  Higher 
value also suggests that any related emotions are also stronger (Dawkins, 1993). Simple 
preference studies will therefore measure what animals in various situations will move away 
from or towards depending on their needs, while cost-preference studies communicate the 
importance of these goals. For instance, research using cost-preference tests have found that 
rats are willing to pay the cost of learning and performing certain behaviours in order to help 
another rat, rather than going for food (Bartal, et al., 2011). In this case, alleviating the distress 
of the other rat was of greater interest than easily accessible food, perhaps indicating that a 
stronger emotional experience was associated with the latter.  
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The existence of the emotional aspects of experiences in animals can further be demonstrated 
when using stress as an emotional indictor and as a form of measurement. In his theory on 
stress and emotions, Broom (2001c) proposes that when an animal faces a challenge in their 
environment, systems respond with various coping mechanisms which, if successful, mean the 
animal in question is coping. However, if these mechanisms fail then mental and bodily 
stability is not maintained and the animal is ‘stressed’. The significant element here is that one 
of the most important aspects of such coping mechanisms are emotions (Broom, 2003). Since 
emotions are difficult to objectify and measure there is advantage in being able to instead 
measure stress as an indirect measure of emotions as opposed to simple behavioural changes. 
Stress can reliably be determined by correlating data from different sources such as behaviour, 
heart rate, cortisol levels and post mortem muscle metabolism levels (Terlouw, et al., 2012). 
Additionally, evidence exists that stress in animals has very similar emotional and 
psychological dimensions as it does in humans (Mason, 1974; Terlouw, 2005). In 
understanding that positive and negative emotions occur alongside the experience of stress, the 
presence of stress can be assessed with regards to psychological welfare and has big 
implications for those studies identifying stress in farmed animals, including the almost 
inevitable stress at the time of slaughter (Terlouw, et al., 2008).  
The last place to look for evidence of emotions in animals comes from evolutionary and 
biological analogies with humans. The essential role that emotions play in survival and the 
concept of evolutionary continuity increases the likelihood that the experiences humans have 
are not limited to this one species. The emotion of fear can perhaps best be used to demonstrate 
the logic behind evolutionary continuity. That is, fear is the body’s way of attempting to remove 
us from situations that are potentially life threatening (Broom, 2001c) and manifests in 
response to stimuli that are recognised and perceived as high risk. Common behavioura l 
responses in humans are the fight and flight actions but in animals also involves ‘freezing’; 
remaining motionless to be invisible to the threat (Broom, 1998). The freezing response is 
apparent in many animals and may shed light on why there is reluctance to entertain the notion 
that other animals may fear just as profoundly as humans do. After all, being motionless is 
harder to detect as an overt sign of fear than active struggle is. Experiencing fear arguably plays 
a major role in creating appropriate behavioural responses to maintain survival, a fact which is 
shared across many species, especially mammals. Although the evolutionary benefits of all of 
the basic emotions cannot be discussed here, the example of fear and the fact that it aids surviva l 
shows that the presence of emotions in other species has an intrinsic logic.  
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In summary, evidence for emotions in animals comes from behavioural studies, preference and 
cost tests, and biological analogy. Although none of these methods on their own provide 
conclusive proof of emotions in animals, their findings converge to suggest that at the very 
least other species do possess basic emotions, which can act as a foundation from which to 
consider emotional dimensions of welfare.  
7.1.2 Emotions and welfare in IAF  
With regards to farmed animals in particular, basic behavioural observations seem to show they 
can be effected by some core emotions. In comparing the behaviour of calves before and after 
debudding (removing or preventing the growth of horns) they were found to be fearful of 
humans, expressed through distancing behaviours which persisted for up to several weeks 
(Lürzel, et al., 2015). Additional observations in chickens also suggests they experience 
happiness associated with dustbathing and that it may be done for the pleasure of doing so 
(Widowski & Duncan, 2000). As for grief in IAF, the clearest example can be seen in the 
separation of calves and mothers, where mothers may bellow and search for days or even weeks 
following the removal of a calf (Joy, 2010, pp. 50, 61). Behavioural changes in farmed animals 
before and after certain events is of course always going to be unique and subject to the 
interpretation of the observer, but it is also a method which controls for anthropomorphism 
(King, 2016) as standardised measures are created from which researchers can objectively 
identify and categorise behaviour.  
Cost-preference studies have also revealed that farmed animals have interests and are often 
willing to pay to pursue them. When given the choice, hens will choose housing that has more 
space, and flooring which is made up of loose shavings as opposed to barren or wire flooring 
(Shields & Duncan, 2009). This preference is significant because hens in traditional IAF 
systems are confined to small areas of space, often fitted with wire flooring to make the removal 
of waste easier (Lay Jr., et al., 2011). Another classic example of a cost experiment was 
conducted with pigs who were taught to push a panel in order to achieve various rewards 
(Dawkins, 1993, p. 157). Each time the pigs received their reward the ‘cost’ increased and they 
were required to push the panel more often. How much the pigs valued each reward, and 
possibly how happy it made them, was indicted in how much they were willing to keep pushing 
to keep achieving it. It was found that the pigs were willing to pay a high cost for certain things 
like food, over others such as social contact showing that in this particular instance food made 
them happier than contact. When trying to answer the question of whether farmed animals 
experience emotions by using scientific study, it raises the methodological question as to 
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whether preference and costs tests are valid tests of emotion. Cost behaviour however, is a 
major part of emotion in humans; humans have negative emotions associated with deprivations 
of food, confinement and injury which encourages us act to reduce and avoid such instances. 
Therefore, the parallels between humans and other animals in this regard adds weight to the 
validity of preference as an indicator of emotional experiences.  
As suggested by Broom’s (Broom, 2001c) theory on stress and emotions, the emotional welfare 
of farmed animals can also be subject to study by directly measuring the presence of stress. 
Stress responses such as behavioural, psychological and physical changes can develop and 
worsen to manifest in animals as trauma and specific psychological illnesses. Trauma is defined 
as an emotional response to a terrible event with both short-term and long-term psychologica l 
consequences (American Psychological Association, n.d). Situations that may cause trauma in 
industrial animals are numerous and include the mutilations mentioned in the previous chapter 
but can also be caused by practises such as early weaning (Joy, 2010) and intens ive 
confinement. Pigs have been shown to suffer from an extreme form of trauma called Porcine 
Stress Syndrome (PSS) in which they may display abnormal behaviours, stereotypies (repeated 
patterns of behaviour that seem to hold no observable function) and self-mutila t ion 
(McCormick Donaldson, n.d). It is noteworthy that PSS has many shared psychologica l 
symptoms with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD): a diagnosis applied to humans who 
display certain physical and psychological disturbances following a traumatic event (World 
Health Organisation, 1993). Both PSS and PTSD are responses to trauma, both may cause 
distressing emotional and psychological symptoms and both share a mixture of environmenta l 
and genetic basis (Joy, 2010, p. 43). Although it cannot conclusively be said that these disorders 
are the same, or that extreme response to trauma is experienced the same in each species, what 
they do share suggests that pigs suffer emotionally and psychologically from trauma and PSS. 
Given that emotions are one mechanism for attempting to cope with stress (Broom, 2001c), 
psychological illnesses caused by stress such as PSS are likely to co-occur with strong 
emotional experiences. Overall, there seem to be many ways which farmed animals 
emotionally suffer in IAF, indicating that emotions are a psychological dimension which may 
lead to poor welfare. 
7.1.3 Moral relevance of emotions  
Emotions do seem to exist in non-human animals to some extent and as shown, negative 
emotions may be experienced in farmed animals in IAF, consequently compromising welfare. 
This statement raises the inevitable question as to whether the emotional distress caused by 
56 
 
IAF is morally acceptable. It can be argued that regardless of whether animal emotions are 
identical to those felt by humans, they should not continue to be treated in a way which 
disregards their potential for emotional distress. Nevertheless, this statement should be subject 
to further reasoning given the disparity that currently exists over how exactly farmed animals 
experience emotions and if they can be negatively affected by them.   
One of the biggest criticism of the emotions debate which has the potential to influence the 
wider moral discussion concerns validity of the scientific evidence used. Behavioura l 
observations, cost-preference tests and biology do not necessary tell us that animals are 
consciously experiencing their emotions. For humans, emotions are more than just how we 
respond to them but also if and how we ‘feel’ them. ‘Feelings’ are the conscious experiences 
of emotions and are a much harder dimension to measure and understand (Dawkins, 2008), 
especially in non-human animals. The main reason for this is that conscious experiences and 
feelings must be communicated through common language and in this regard the gap between 
species is too big for analogy with humans to bridge. Although one human can never fully 
know the conscious emotional experience of another human, analogy is still used between 
ourselves and others to understand them: an assumption which seems logical and in most cases 
seems to work well enough (Dawkins, 1993). Yet this analogy stops when comparing different 
species for fear that the differences between species are too great and to express a view 
otherwise is likely either anthropomorphism or unprofessionalism. This issue is significant as 
it limits what can be said about the welfare impact of negative emotions upon animals in IAF. 
On the other hand, these doubts can be addressed by paying attention to biological similarit ies. 
All mammals seem to possess the same neurological, molecular and physiological basis for the 
basic experience of emotions as well as expressing comparable patterns of activity in specific 
brain regions when emotionally stimulated (Panksepp, 2005). Consequently, Michael Cabanac 
(1979) believes that the theoretical step which would allow for the inclusion of non-human 
animals as conscious experiencers of emotions is not so large; ‘feelings’ share a functiona l 
connection with the physiological and behavioural dimensions of emotions, and given that 
human and non-human share many behavioural and physiological elements of emotion, the 
chances that conscious feelings are also shared is very high. It cannot be said conclusively that 
this is the case but the important point to make here is that extrapolating what we know of 
human emotional experience to animals is not as illogical or unfounded as it is often seen in 
scientific research, it should therefore be given due consideration and perhaps not dismissed as 
human projection.  
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To address the criticism that it is anthropomorphic and incorrect to attribute ‘human emotions’ 
to other animals it should be noted that not only is there converging evidence from biologica l 
science, evolution and the logic of behaviour that emotions are strikingly similar across 
mammals, it should also be bore in mind that humans are animals thus human sensations are 
animal sensations (Safina, 2015). It is wrong to project human experiences onto farmed animals 
yet the academic and professional insistence on being so rigid on the matter arguably damages 
animal science. To insist that farmed animals possess nothing or very little in the way of 
emotions is a misunderstanding and is, according to Safina (2015), attempting to make our 
species seem special. Of course, one cannot completely disagree with Marian Stamp Dawkins 
that it is possible animals may have emotional states in the absence of subjective experiences 
of feelings (Dawkins, 2000). However, given the considerable welfare issues which exist if 
farmed animals do indeed suffer from conscious feelings of grief, sadness and fear, is it not 
arguably the morally correct option to act as if they do? To illustrate, human grief is heightened 
by the ability to contemplate and anticipate death, but it remains doubtful as to whether other 
species are affected by this (King, 2016). Nonetheless, unique features of grief, sadness and 
fear such as these do not consequently mean that other animals suffer a less profound 
experience of emotions than humans.   
Although scientific research into animal emotions is not able to conclude the existence of full 
conscious feelings in non-human animals, it does make clear that the basis for conscious 
experience at least exists, meaning conscious feelings in animals are possible. Science and 
current understanding does not, and possibly never will, allow an individual to fully understand 
another mind other than their own but that does not mean science should have no say, especially 
where moral issues are concerned. Science makes theories and predictions based on what the 
evidence indicates (Broom, 1998), an approach applied to all areas of science and study, 
including those concerned with human functioning. It can thus be argued that it is important, 
especially when studying something as difficult as animal emotions, to be willing to listen to 
the weight of evidence and act accordingly (Panksepp, 2005); the tendency to wait for the 
presentation of inarguable proof before acting upon information which has moral relevance can 
potentially have huge implications.  
7.2 Cognition  
The next area which can be considered with regards to psychological welfare in farmed animals 
is cognitive functioning. Cognition is a psychological term which refers to the features and 
58 
 
processes of knowing or ‘thinking’ (Gerrig & Zimbardo, 2002). Examples of processes and 
features of cognition include memories, problem solving, reasoning, attention and mental 
concepts. The aim of this section is not to argue that animals we may deem to possess low 
intelligence have less value than those with high intelligence or that our moral consideration 
toward them should be any less. The aim is instead to assess whether levels of cognit ive 
functioning affect awareness: a trait which has implications for the psychological welfare of 
farmed animals in IAF. The specific cognitive abilities discussed here will include intelligence, 
learning and language with the goal of evaluating the role they play in the welfare of farmed 
animals. The last section will look at some of the broader issues in attempting to use current 
scientific understanding and methods to measure cognition in other species.  
7.2.1 Intelligence 
Non-human animals do not seem to display the same levels of intelligent reasoning as humans 
but that does not mean they are unintelligent or that complex functions are not present. Recent 
developments in psychology, biology and veterinary science have revealed that most species 
are indeed misunderstood with regards to intelligence, including those subject to farming. 
Intelligence is an ambiguous term but will be defined here as the ‘ability to acquire and apply 
new knowledge and skills’ (Anon., n.d(b)) and not the narrower definition of the abilit ies 
measured through IQ tests.  
There are several animal species which are commonly considered to be fairly intelligent, such 
as whales, dogs and primates. Less commonly known is the intelligence of pigs, who are now 
understood to be one of the most intelligent species outside of the primate groups. Recent 
behavioural research has shown that pigs are able to perform tasks that human infants cannot, 
like the ability to use a mirror to deduce the location of hidden food (Broom, et al., 2009). The 
importance of this study is that it shows that pigs possess an awareness of themselves, their 
surroundings and the changing features in their environment. Neurological studies have also 
highlighted their intelligence; the brains of piglets have been compared those of human infants 
with regards to growth, development and anatomy (Conrad, et al., 2012; Conrad, et al., 2014) 
and are considered so similar that piglets are often used in place of human infants in studies of 
development (University of Illinois College of Agricultural, Consumer and Environmenta l 
Sciences , 2012). Pigs are therefore closely compared to humans on a scientific scale yet are 
not awarded equal moral consideration with regards to the potential to psychologically suffer. 
Pigs show a uniqueness in intelligence as well as demonstrating the presence of some higher 
intellectual functions in a farmed species. Although this cannot be generalised to all other non-
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human animals it does show that a species frequently subject to low psychological welfare of 
IAF systems are in fact intellectually sophisticated.  
Another farmed animal worth considering with regards to intelligence are chickens. Birds in 
general are perhaps some of the most cognitively underrated of animals. Recent studies have 
revealed their incredible cognitive capacity, including facial recognition (Stephan, et al., 2012), 
human voice recognition (Wascher, et al., 2012), Theory of Mind (Jackson, 2016) and even 
certain indications of abstract thought and conceptual reasoning (Martinho III & Kacelnik, 
2016). With regards to chickens, they display a high ability for recognition of their own species 
(Dawkins, 1995) and for the facial recognition of humans (Davis & Taylor, 2001). The 
sophisticated levels of memory chickens seem to possess are probably a significant part of the 
large and complex social hierarchies they form if given more natural conditions. However, it 
is perhaps demonstrations of higher order abilities which are the more surprising properties of 
their cognitive functioning. There exists evidence that chickens can exhibit self-control and the 
capacity to anticipate the future (Abeyesinghe, et al., 2005). Additional findings that chickens 
seem to be able to recognise their own pain and actively attempt minimise it (Danbury, et al., 
2000) has particular relevance to the discussion of pain and welfare in IAF. The ability to 
understand that they are in pain indicates that chickens in industrial farms who are vulnerab le 
to injuries and mutilations (see Chapter 6), may also suffer psychologically as a result. On the 
other hand, a simpler explanation must be entertained; that chickens who seem to try to 
minimise their pain are simply acting in a programmed manner with no necessary recognit ion 
or awareness (Dawkins, 2006). 
It is at this point that the importance of the ability to learn is brought into the analysis. If other 
species besides humans can demonstrate learning and behavioural change, it counters the belief 
that their behaviour is ruled by innate automatic responses in the absence of deeper thought. 
The study of chickens carrying out self-selection for pain relief used a method in which they 
had to learn which courses of action would lead to a reduction in pain and which would not, 
often multiple times (Danbury, et al., 2000); demonstrating that they could recognise the 
consequences of their behaviour and adapt it accordingly to achieve a desired result. Similar 
capacities have also been found in pigs who have been known to learn to accurately play a 
simple target game (Martz, 1997) as well as perform certain actions for rewards and adjust this 
behaviour depending on the reward (Matthews & Ladewig, 1987). Despite these 
advancements, chickens in particular are still considered to be so radically different from 
humans that they are awarded the least consideration of farmed animals after fish. The 
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sentiment is perhaps best summed up by Marian Dawkins who states that humans are inflic ted 
with an unfortunately common form of prejudice when we ‘assume that the more the animal 
looks like and interacts with us the cleverer it must be’ (Dawkins, 1993, p. 127). Despite this 
prejudice, there are strong indications that farmed animals possess deep levels of thinking 
making them more than just automatic responses. Unfortunately, higher intelligence may also 
mean there is a higher potential for psychological suffering, whether due to increased 
awareness or a higher need for stimulation.  
7.2.2 Language  
Language is an ability which, for some, demonstrates the presence of a unique intelligence 
existent only in humans (Marshall, 2013), yet there is evidence that the origin of spoken 
language is not exclusive to humans; orangutans are known to be able to mimic the pitch and 
tone of human voices (Lameira, et al., 2016). Although this does not necessarily mean they 
could form words and speech to the same extent as humans, it does suggest that language is 
not an ability that can demonstrate human superiority and originality. This position is supported 
by the growing number of studies showing that species other than humans possess language in 
some form or another. For example, groups of monkeys are able convey very specific 
information through a series of different grunts which researchers were not able to distinguish 
or differentiate (Dawkins, 1993, pp. 22-24). Whale communication has also been found to 
contain complex organisation and features which resemble forms of grammar (Suzuki, et al., 
2006). Even though many species do display their own unique forms of vocal language, 
communication may also come in the form of signs, actions and body language. For instance, 
human babies are not able to talk yet can be understood through other means, such as body 
language and crying. It therefore remains unsurprising that animals may also convey 
information in the absence of ‘speech’. In light of this knowledge, it can be argued that 
language is not missing in other species but just exists in different forms to our own, forms 
which humans may not fully be able to understand (Dawkins, 1993).  
Farmed species are no exception when it comes to recent discoveries in animal language 
abilities. Research on cows has shown for the first time how mothers and their calves 
communicate; mothers use low and high frequency calls depending on the proximity of their 
calves (Padilla de la Torrea, et al., 2015) and is supported by observations of high pitched 
bellows from dairy cows following the removal of their young (Joy, 2010, pp. 50, 61). An 
additional, and perhaps more significant, finding of the study by Padilla de la Torrea et al. 
(2015) is that cows use distinct, individualised calls to communicate with each other making it 
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possible to distinguish between individual cows by their vocalisations. Similar discoveries have 
also been made in pigs and chickens. Chickens have over 30 unique calls each conveying 
different information (Cornish, 2013), while the grunts made by pigs vary depending on their 
differing personalities (Friel, et al., 2016). Information on the communication of pigs was 
obtained by manipulating the environment to reflect poor-quality or enriched housing, finding 
that vocalisations were reduced in poor-quality conditions. Variations in pig communica t ion 
have been found to be an indicator of welfare as certain sounds may convey information 
regarding emotional, psychological and motivational wellbeing (ibid). This, and the outcome 
of the study suggests that poor-quality environments are a detriment to psychological health 
which has implications for the welfare of pigs confined in IAF systems.  
Evidence suggests that animals do possess various levels of language capabilities but that 
humans may very well miss the communications passing between other species and continue 
to assume they possess an overall lack of cognitive ability. Instead of assuming humans are the 
only species with a more complex vocal language an attempt should be made to understand 
that the languages used by other species may just be harder for us to detect and understand. 
Although the possession of language does not necessarily directly affect whether farmed 
animals suffer in IAF or not, it is relevant to welfare questions in other ways. Firstly, 
understanding more about farmed animal language can give researchers possible indictors of 
physical and psychological states which can be used to measure welfare in various conditions 
and determine which practises are specifically detrimental. Additionally, language is a 
cognitive ability which indicates complexity, intelligence and awareness, all of which increase 
the capacity to suffer from low psychological welfare. Despite observations of wide cognit ive 
abilities in animals, conclusive statements are still more difficult to make than when studying 
physical welfare due to several methodological and epistemological issues.  
7.2.3 Limitations of science in animal cognition 
When assessing animals in terms of cognitive functioning it is worth noting that one cannot 
fully measure and consider many cognitive abilities in comparable ways to humans. This 
statement is especially true with regards to intelligence, which for most people refers to IQ and 
the abilities measured by IQ tests, but as IQ is not applicable to non-human animals, it cannot 
be compared. Once removed from a human context, intelligence can instead be regarded as 
many things and so it can be argued that animals display greater intelligence than humans in a 
number of areas.  
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One rather well known example is that of Clever Hans, the horse who was thought to possess 
unusual levels of intelligence as he seemed to be able to count and correctly answer simple 
mathematical sums (Boakes, 1984). Following close observation Hans was in fact found to be 
intelligent in an altogether different way; instead of being able to perform arithmetic he was 
picking up on very small subtle cues from the humans around him to deduce the correct 
answers. Those who worked with Hans were not even consciously aware of the cues they were 
giving and even made active effort to avoid them, yet Hans was still able to pick up on signs 
to give the right answers (Dawkins, 1993, pp. 68-71). The ability to pick up on small and 
unconscious cues to consistently produce the correct response demonstrates a form of 
intelligence far removed from the human concept of IQ. Although the example of clever Hans 
is a case study and is thus not generalisable to others of his species, the wider point is that 
intelligence can take on a broader definition. Intelligence can instead be argued to be high 
levels of ability in things which benefit the creature who possesses it; cognitive capacities that 
somehow aid survival do not necessarily have to be shared between species to be something 
worthy of being called intelligent.  
The possibility of specialised intelligences in other species highlights the fact that there is a lot 
we do not know or understand about animals and animal cognition. Even with the aid of science 
and the scientific method, there remains aspects of animal psychology which we cannot 
currently measure or quantify and perhaps never will. Recent discoveries about the workings 
of other species have often produced unexpected results and challenged some of the common 
perceptions held. For example, contrary to the belief that sheep are dumb, evidence suggests 
that their well-known mimicry behaviour is in fact a display of collective intelligence which 
allows them to share and act on information about predators (CNRS, 2015; Constable, 2017).  
Additionally, something akin to culture and cultural transmission has been found to exist in 
non-human animals for the first time (Balter, 2013). Yet for all the new knowledge uncovered, 
there remain aspects of animal behaviour and psychology that we cannot understand or predict. 
A good example of our lack of insight is found in grouse mating habits; females are able to 
detect something in their perspective mates that indicates which males will survive and which 
will not (Dawkins, 1993, p. 14). Despite keen observation and study this variable is not known 
to researchers, suggesting there may be more complex processes happening between grouse 
which are not easily detected by other species. The abilities and capacities which are not known 
or understood fully by humans may also mean that farmed animals possess levels of awareness 
much higher than we credit them for. 
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Although there is much ambiguity and disagreement with regards to which cognitive functions 
farmed animals have, strong scientific evidence suggests that many species besides humans do 
possess significant levels of intelligence, including the ability to learn and communicate in 
unique and possibly complex languages. Even though there are many things science does not 
tell us regarding animal psychology, recent discoveries indicate that they are in fact more 
complex than automatic and purely instinct based. Such evidence and studies which have 
revealed our ignorance of animal cognition (e.g. grouse mating habits, monkey grunts) 
simultaneously highlight why humans should give farmed animals the benefit of the doubt 
when it comes to the capacity to psychologically suffer.  
7.3 Consciousness 
Determining levels of consciousness is significant in the debate on animal welfare in IAF as 
being able to personally experience and understand one’s conditions may alter the degree to 
which one can psychologically suffer. Throughout academia and research, the terms 
‘consciousness’ and ‘sentience’ refer to different things but for the purposes of this thesis the 
corresponding terms of ‘access consciousness’ and ‘phenomenal consciousness’ will be used. 
Phenomenal consciousness compromises of basic senses and experiences such as feeling pain 
or emotions. Access consciousness refers to the higher order experiences which allow for 
deeper thought and discussion on past and present memories (Davies & Humphreys, 1993). 
The previous sections on emotion and cognition have presented evidence which perhaps covers 
many aspects of phenomenal consciousness, but the question still remains as to whether non-
human animals have self-awareness and can subjectively experience their lives. This section 
will therefore discuss some of the scientific evidence around the existence of consciousness in 
other species while simultaneously assessing the extent to which methodological flaws hamper 
the understanding of consciousness. The section will finish with a broader debate around 
whether it is actually possible to determine access consciousness and whether it is therefore 
possible to know its role on animal welfare in IAF.  
7.3.1 Evidence of consciousness 
One method of distinguishing whether consciousness is present in animals is through 
observation and study of behavioural markers. Cabanac et al. (2009) states that there are certain 
behaviours that indicate an organism is conscious: play, expression of emotions, emotiona l 
fever, expression of sensory pleasure and taste aversion. It is further suggested that these 
behaviours are common to all amniotes, and therefore farmed animals, due to an early shared 
evolutionary origin. However, behavioural studies should be handled with caution when used 
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alone as evidence of consciousness. The reason being that it is hard to distinguish conscious 
responses from automatic ones when observing behaviour; a species that seems to show 
awareness of its environment and itself does not necessarily make it a species that has complex 
personal processes (Seth, et al., 2005). Conversely, the argument that other species do possess 
consciousness is not founded on behavioural research alone but is also supported by biologica l 
evidence. To start, the rationale behind the ideas on consciousness of Cabanac et al. (2009) is 
that all animals which share these markers have also been shown to share similar anatomica l, 
chemical and functional components of these behaviours.  
The presence of basic biological elements of consciousness across species is solidified by 
homology. All mammals have the same neurological processing activity and development 
within the thalamocortical complex which has been found to be essential to human 
consciousness (Seth, et al., 2005). The strength of the scientific evidence is summed up in the 
Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (Low, 2012), a document formulated by prominent 
scientists specialising in various branches of neuro-science. The main purpose of the 
declaration is to affirm that non-human mammals do display intentional conscious behaviours 
and possess the neuroanatomical, chemical and physiological substrates for consciousness. The 
Cambridge Declaration further states that there is a high chance that conscious awareness 
extends beyond mammals as evidence is strong that similar neural activity is also present in 
birds. There does seem to be more variation across bird species than there are across mammal 
species but overall, avian structures related to consciousness seem homologous with those of 
mammals. The implications of the evidence supported by the declaration is that farmed 
animals, including pigs, cows and chickens, all possess the biological components of 
consciousness.   
A criticism of the conclusion of the Cambridge Declaration, and with homology in general, is 
that comparison of brain structure and processes with humans is only concluding that other 
species can react to pleasant and noxious stimuli. In general, the method is considered a rather 
superficial one which apparently fails to tell us anything because observable behaviours and 
biological features do not guarantee that the underlying cognition is the same (Povinelli & 
Giambrone, 1999); there is more to psychological functions like consciousness than the 
measurable biological structures and anatomy that underlie them. Homology does not therefore 
necessarily inform us of conscious experiences, and as such can be seen as weak evidence for 
access consciousness. Yet homology and the declaration are far from useless as evidence 
because at the very least they inform us that other species possess the same biology as us, which 
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is a start for measuring consciousness. It is evidence that points more towards the possibility 
that animals do possess subjective awareness than that they do not and is therefore far from 
redundant as evidence. 
It is no straightforward feat to measure consciousness with science as it is not a concept which 
can be easily objectified and strongly defined. The reason being that consciousness is an 
internal aspect of people and is therefore limited to oneself, so determining whether humans 
are the only species with the concept of ‘I’ is often considered impossible. Although this is a 
significant methodological problem, uncovering consciousness in animals is based on the 
convergence of behavioural, evolutionary, neurological, chemical and anatomical evidence. 
The pooling of information and evidence acts to strengthen the validity of each individua l 
method while providing a relatively reliable indication of consciousness. Even so, the 
collaborating evidence is often not enough to convince those who maintain that the study of 
consciousness is destined to failure, as it can never be known for certain what other species 
experience internally, a view which plays an important part in the broader debate on the nature 
of consciousness.  
7.3.2 Can consciousness ever be determined?  
Despite scientific evidence indicating that animals do hold consciousness, the topic still seems 
to be highly debated in professional circles. The weight of evidence alone, from biologica l 
analogy, observations and evolutionary origins seems to tip the balance in favour of arguing 
that other species do indeed possess consciousness. However, there also exists the debate that 
the current evidence on animal consciousness is not yet conclusive, consequently making it 
incorrect to assume that awareness is present. One key proponent of this position is Marian 
Dawkins, who states that it cannot ever be known for sure if non-human animals are conscious 
due to its internal and thus immeasurable nature (Dawkins, 2008). She denounces evidence 
such as behavioural observations and case studies as speculative and thus biocentrica l ly 
anthropomorphic. As the majority of evidence for animal consciousness stems from these 
methods, Dawkins (Dawkins, 2012, pp. 171-172) argues that the knowledge gap with regards 
to animal consciousness has yet to be filled or even significantly reduced. However, what is 
known of animal consciousness has not purely been deduced from observations of case studies 
alone. As detailed above, evidence also comes from the logic of evolutionary continuity, 
behavioural indicators and species similarities with regards to aspects of the brain which are 
considered to be indicators of consciousness.  
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On the other hand, there arguably does still remain an element of anthropomorphism in 
biological homology and behavioural comparisons. Dawkins strongly criticises allowing the 
presence of anthropomorphic thinking into animal studies because it is fundamenta l ly 
detrimental to animals (Dawkins, 2012). To do so is to risk misinterpreting non-human animals 
to the extent that we also misunderstand their needs, interests etc. She therefore raises an 
important point in suggesting that animals subject to scientific study should be allowed to speak 
for themselves instead of relying on making comparisons to humans. Methods which allow for 
this include preference and cost-preference tests, examples of which have been detailed 
previously in the study of non-human animal emotions and cognition (sections 7.1 and 7.2). 
However, such methods are not as applicable when studying something as abstract and interna l 
as consciousness. There is possibly no verified reliable and valid way of directly testing for 
consciousness but the current methods of observations and biological comparisons are arguably 
the best available, there may thus be no benefit in not acknowledging what this evidence 
implies. 
In contrast to the view held by Dawkins, Professor Marc Bekoff holds the position that it is in 
fact continuous scepticism and denial of evidence on animal psychological capabilities that is 
actually detrimental to welfare (Bekoff, 2012). The rationale behind this is that denying animal 
consciousness, at even the most basic levels is to consequently discount all of the supporting 
scientific evidence. Although demonstrating rigidity, scepticism and thoroughness in scientific 
research is generally a positive approach, it can also show a lack of flexibility and openness to 
the currently available evidence. In fact, Bekoff argues that to demand ever more ridged and 
controlled scientific study despite the current evidence, is to also encourage more invasive and 
potentially harmful research on animals (Bekoff, 2012); somewhat of a contradiction given that 
much of the study of animal consciousness is to ultimately aid understanding of animals and 
animal welfare (Bekoff, 2012). It should be noted that Bekoff and those who hold similar 
positions do not suggest that the evidence on animal consciousness should be taken as proof, 
only that it should instead be treated with the same level of caution as all scientific research 
and not dismissed. The fundamental concern is that in the attempt to avoid all potential cases 
of anthropomorphism, there is a danger of missing what the data might be communicating.  
It cannot be answered here whether any non-human animal is fully conscious but the evidence 
that is available can still be considered with regards to animal welfare in IAF and questions of 
animal ethics in general. The scientific study of animal consciousness comes down to 
determining facts and generating evidence on various biological and chemical functions so, in 
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going back to Harris’s (Harris, 2010a) proposition that facts lie at the core of moral issues, such 
information is of strong relevance to the moral assessment of IAF. The pursuit of facts 
concerning whether non-human animals are conscious, which ones and to what extent is 
significant in the debate over to what degree animals can psychologically suffer. The 
significance of consciousness and sentience lies in the belief that it is these features which 
allow a being to really ‘experience’ life, and therefore their surroundings, as opposed to being 
a simple rule-based organism only. To lean on the idea that animals are purely instinctual and 
‘mechanical’ and are not negatively affected by the unnatural conditions humans subject them 
to is to believe that psychological welfare of farmed animals is not compromised in IAF.  
 
Conversely, it can be argued that level of consciousness is irrelevant in the welfare debate as it 
is not necessary in feeling pain and discomfort. Even in the absence of full awareness, the 
degree to which farmed animals have the capacity to experience pain and psychologica l 
suffering in IAF are still significant factors in contemplating our moral obligations towards 
other species. Based on the evidence presented for emotions, cognition and consciousness, 
what is conclusive is that is that farmed animals do experience something. Nevertheless, if 
access consciousness did happen to be absolutely necessary in experiencing suffering, would 
it not be best to listen to the weight of the evidence and assume animals possess it as opposed 
to assuming they do not?  Even if the current evidence concerning animal consciousness was 
balanced, surely more weight should be given to the supporting evidence; it would be difficult 
to morally justify acting as if animals possess no subjective awareness when welfare is affected 
to such a degree if they do so.  
 
In summary, despite its methodological limitations, the behavioural and biological evidence 
concerning animal consciousness converges to indicate that it is in fact present in non-humans, 
to at least some degree. Yet, this conclusion depends upon the assumption that consciousness 
can be known and measured, an assumption which is highly doubted when it comes to species 
other than humans. The debate which exists within the scientific community is not conclusive 
on whether consciousness can be determined, yet high levels of professional ambiguity have 
implications for farmed animals. Even though evidence is relatively high, scientists remain 
extremely cautious and refrain from making strong statements for non-human animal 
consciousness (Martinho, 2106). Yet this position arguably encourages further animal testing 
and has welfare and moral implications for the animals in IAF. 
68 
 
7.4 Conclusion  
Overall, scientific research seems to show that IAF is a detriment to farmed animals as many 
of the practises and conditions negatively affect psychological welfare. Evidence from studies 
using a variety of scientific methods have shown that animals seem to possess and display a 
wide array of emotions; farmed animals are no exception and therefore potentially suffer in a 
number of ways from negative emotions in IAF. Animals also possess many surprising 
cognitive abilities which, although may not be quite how humans use them, demonstrate that 
many animals possess high levels of intelligence and awareness. Lastly, the chapter 
demonstrated that all mammals and possibly birds possess the known biological components, 
and some behavioural, markers of consciousness. Although there exists doubt as to whether 
they have full self-awareness, it is difficult to say conclusively due to difficulties in measuring 
consciousness. Either way, even though consciousness can potentially enhance the ways in 
which animals can psychologically suffer it is not essential for suffering.  
 
Although there is a certain amount of ambiguity and uncertainty regarding non-human 
psychological properties, it can be stated that farmed animals can and do suffer low 
psychological welfare in IAF which is affected by the presence of these characteristics. That 
is, the significance is not on the possession of characteristics like language and cognition, as 
these are arbitrary boundaries for not extending moral consideration (Singer, 1975), but how 
these characteristics allow and enhance suffering. Once this effect is understood there is no 
moral justification for not taking psychological suffering into account. From then, it can be 
reasoned whether compromising welfare by inflicting psychological suffering is justified or 
necessary. Psychological suffering may be less obvious than physical suffering but is arguably 
no less important to consider from a moral point of view. In many cases of psychologica l 
suffering, like frustration and extreme boredom, welfare may be improved through 
amendments such as environmental enrichment and better housing. However, the majority of 
psychological suffering in IAF is almost unavoidable. The separation of mother and offspring, 
fear and stress at slaughter, and distress from deprivation of natural environment are all caused 
by features which are essential parts of the system. If low welfare is not necessary, assessing 
moral acceptability from a perspective of psychology consequently means looking at whether 
such welfare compromises are justified. It is at this point that the ‘welfare’ approach fails; no 
improvements to conditions will remove poor psychological welfare without completely 
changing the nature of IAF. Moral reasoning again leads to the question of overall benefit of 
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IAF, which has been established to be insufficient in most considerations, including against 
health, violence, biological and psychological animal suffering. Ending this form of suffer ing 
almost surely means ending IAF.  
 
CHAPTER  8:CONCLUSION  
The first research question, how animals suffer due to conditions and practises in IAF, has been 
addressed in this thesis by showing that cows, pigs and chickens are all subject to procedures 
which often hugely compromise welfare. Empirical evidence has shown that animals in IAF 
can and do physically suffer; demonstrated through paying attention to a number of particular 
practises and conditions in which pain and stress to the body was evident. The potential for 
farmed animals to psychologically suffer was also revealed to be high, by showing that most 
animals possess many features and indications of emotion, cognition and consciousness, many 
of which are affected in IAF.  
Each of the areas covered come together to address the second research question of whether it 
is morally reasonable and acceptable to subject animals to industrial farming, which concludes 
that from a scientific perspective, it is not. Scientific evidence and theory tells us that humans 
and other animals are much closer in the phylogenetic tree than is commonly understood. Most 
criteria used to establish the ridged categories we hold regarding ourselves and farmed species 
are in fact rather weak constructs. In following the principles of utilitarianism, if humans and 
farmed animals share interests and we award them both equal weight, the moral acceptability 
of IAF comes down to the two questions of necessity and justification. As seen throughout the 
discussion, there are often alternatives to many IAF practises including altering animal 
conditions which would, for instance, reduce aggression and render some practices needless. 
Additionally, the negative effects upon humans of not carrying out these practices would have 
to be significantly higher than the effects doing them has upon the animals. However, having 
seen the degree and scale of suffering such activities have upon farmed animal welfare the 
balance is far from proportional. As mentioned previously, most of these practices are done so 
for reasons such as meat quality, ease of handling and cost-effectiveness and are therefore far 
from critical. They arguably do little to compromise human welfare while those that do, mainly 
handling issues for farmers, may perhaps be improved with the placement of extra safety 
measures, training and improvement to animal environments. Given that IAF is neither 
necessary nor justified it is strongly suggested to be morally unacceptable. 
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There has also been effort to address the additional aim of demonstrating that science and 
philosophy should not be kept separate when discussing moral issues. Scientific evidence, such 
as the research presented, has been instrumental over the past decade in changing the way 
countries, producers and retailers approach the welfare of farmed animals (Broom, 2003). Facts 
and science are thus invaluable in the IAF debate around moral acceptability but they are not 
the definitive arbiters of ethical questions (Garner, 2005), moral philosophical discussion is 
just as important. This is because even if morals are in fact about welfare, it does not in any 
way determine how we should act or what values we should hold, as the science which can 
inform moral questions are not definitive rules on how we should behave. Engagement with 
utilitarianism and ideas of equal consideration of interest help provide reasons as to why the 
scientific outputs about the lives of farmed animals should be acknowledged and acted upon. 
For instance, the evidence that farmed animals have interests in not feeling pain, physical 
discomfort and psychological distress means that from the position of utilitarianism it is clear 
that these interests are both greater than the human preference for cheap meat and also highly 
disregarded in in IAF. The common interests between humans and non-human animals which 
are affected in farmed animals means that to equally consider their interests, IAF must cease 
to continue to operate, regardless of proposed or actual welfare changes. It is therefore highly 
useful for both scientists and philosophers to present what they find, to create a convergent 
body of knowledge which can inform people about animals, their functions and their situations 
(Broom, 2016). 
Lastly, there has been an attempt to show how the problem of IAF is a relevant concern to those 
working for peace. IAF not only harms farmed animals but also damages people, wildlife and 
ecosystems. IAF is therefore a topic which is particularly relevant to the achievement of peace; 
this is because in addition to welfare, health and environmental impacts, IAF plays a significant 
part in the creation of structural violence. What engaging in science and moral reasoning 
therefore reveals, is that IAF causes significant, prolonged and needless suffering, a fact which 
should outweigh societal beliefs and desires. IAF is thus clearly a problem which is a big barrier 
to attaining peace for both humans and other animals and it not one which should be widely 
































Abeyesinghe, S. M., Nicol, C. J., Hartnell, S. J. & Wathes, C. M., 2005. Can domestic fowl, Gallus gallus 
domesticus, show self-control?. Animal Behaviour, 70(1), pp. 1-11. 
ADAPTT, n.d. The kill counter. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.adaptt.org/about/the-kill-counter.html 
[Accessed 16 September 2016]. 
Agbeniga, B. & Webb, E. C., 2012. Effect of slaughter technique on bleed-out, blood in the trachea 
and blood splash in the lungs of cattle. South African Journal of Animal Science , 42(5), pp. 524-529. 
AHDB, n.d. Symptoms of Mastitis. [Online]  
Available at: https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/technical-information/animal-health-
welfare/mastitis/symptoms-of-mastitis/#.WRxrmoVOJrR 
[Accessed 17 May 2017]. 
American Psychological Association, n.d. Trauma. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.apa.org/topics/trauma/ 
[Accessed 18 May 2017]. 
Anderson, T., 2006. Globalization and agricultural trade: the market access and food security 
dilemmas of developing countries. In: B. N. Ghosh & H. M. Guven, eds. Globalization and the third 
world: A study of negative consequences. New York: Palgrave Macmill, pp. 251-262. 
Anil, M. H., Whittington, P. E. & McKinstry, J. L., 2000. The effect of the sticking method on the 
welfare of slaughter pigs. Meat Science, Volume 55, pp. 315-319. 
Anil, M. et al., 2006. Comparison of Halal slaughter with captive bolt stunning and neck cutting in 
cattle: exsanguination and quality parameters. Animal Welfare, 15(4), pp. 325-330. 
Animal Aid, 2013. Dark waters: an Animal Aid report examining the impact of eating fish on animal 
welfare, human health and the environment. ISBN: 978-1-905327-33-1, s.l.: Animal Aid. 
Animal Aid, 2014. Casual brutality of chicken catching exposed. [Online]  
Available at: http://animalaid.wpengine.com/casual-brutality-chicken-catching-exposed/ 
[Accessed 13 May 2017]. 
Animal Aid, n.d(a). The battle of the battery cage., s.l.: Animal Aid. 
Animal Aid, n.d(b). The suffering of ‘broiler’ chickens, s.l.: Animal Aid. 
Animal Aid, n.d(c). Battery cows: Zero grazing and the dairy industry, Kent: Animal Aid . 
Animal Equality, 2012. Pigs brutally stabbed with swords on Spanish pig farm to supply leading UK 
Supermarket Morrisons. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.animalequality.net/news/360/pigs-brutally-stabbed-swords-spanish-pig-
farm-supply-leading-uk-supermarket-morrisons 
[Accessed 24 January 2017]. 
Animal Ethics, n.d(a). Animal interests. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.animal-ethics.org/animal-interests/ 
[Accessed 1 May 2017]. 
73 
 
Animal Ethics, n.d(b). The slaughter of animals used for food. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.animal-ethics.org/slaughter-animals-used-food/#sdfootnote28sym 
[Accessed 25 May 2017]. 
Animal Rights, n.d. Sluit het varkensslachthuis tielt. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.animalrights.be/sluit-het-varkensslachthuis-tielt 
[Accessed 13 May 2017]. 
Anon., 2010. Pain [Def. 1]. In: Concise Medical Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Anon., n.d(a). Mutilate. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.dictionary.com/browse/mutilate 
[Accessed 24 May 2017]. 
Anon., n.d(b). Intelligence. [Online]  
Available at: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/intelligence 
[Accessed 25 May 2017]. 
AO, IFAD, WFP, 2015. The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2015. Meeting the 2015 international 
hunger targets: taking stock of uneven progress, Rome: FAO. 
AussieAbattoirs, n.d. Age of animals slaughtered. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.aussieabattoirs.com/facts/age-slaughtered 
[Accessed 24 May 2017]. 
Balter, M., 2013. Strongest evidence of animal culture seen in monkeys and whales. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2013/04/strongest-evidence-animal-culture-seen-
monkeys-and-whales 
[Accessed 20 May 2017]. 
Bartal, I. B.-A., Decety, J. & Mason, P., 2011. Empathy and pro-social behavior in rats. Science, 
334(6061), pp. 1427-1430. 
Becerill-Herrera, M. et al., 2009. CO2 stunning may compromise swine welfare compared with 
electrical stunning. Meat Science, Volume 81, pp. 233-237. 
Bekoff, M., 2009. Grief in animals: It's arrogant to think we're the only animals who mourn. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/animal-emotions/200910/grief-in-animals-its-
arrogant-think-were-the-only-animals-who-mourn 
[Accessed 25 May 2017]. 




[Accessed 25 May 2017]. 
Bekoff, M. & Jamieson, D., 1990. Cognitive ethology and applied philosophy: the significance of an 
evolutionary biology of mind. Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 5(5), pp. 156-159. 
Bermond, B., 1997 . The myth of animal suffering. In: M. Dol, et al. eds. Animal Consciousness and 
Animal Ethics. Assen: Van Gorcum, pp. 125-143. 
74 
 
Blom, H. J. M. et al., 1992. Description and validation of a preference test system to evaluate housing 
conditions for laboratory mice. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, Volume 35, pp. 67-82. 
Boakes, R., 1984. From Darwin to behaviourism: psychology and the minds of animals. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bouvard, V. et al., 2016. Carcinogenicity of consumption of red and processed meats. The Lancet 
Oncology, Volume 16, pp. 1599-1600. 
Bovine Genome Sequencing and Analysis Consortium, et al., 2009. The genome sequence of taurine 
cattle: a window to ruminant biology and evolution. Science, 324(5926), pp. 522-528. 
Bowles, D., Wrathall, M. & Fernyhough, M., 2015. Beak trimming and animal welfare, s.l.: RSPCA. 
Boyd, F., 1994. Humane slaughter of poultry: The case against the use of electrical stunning devices. 
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics , Volume 7, pp. 221-236. 
Brandt, P. & Aaslyng, M. D., 2015. Welfare measurements of finishing pigs on the day of slaughter: A 
review. Meat Science, Volume 103, pp. 13-23. 
Brennan, A. & Lo, Y., 2016. Environmental ethics. [Online]  
Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=ethics-
environmental&archive=win2016 
[Accessed 13 May 2017]. 
Brodie, C., 2004. An interview with Richard Dawkins. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.americanscientist.org/bookshelf/pub/richard-dawkins 
[Accessed 14 May 2017]. 
Broom, D., 1998. Welfare, stress, and the evolution of feelings. Advances in the Study of Behaviour, 
Volume 27, pp. 371-403. 
Broom, D., 2001b. Effects of dairy cattle breeding and production methods on animal welfare, Punta 
del Este: World Association for Buiatrics. 
Broom, D., 2016. Sentience and animal welfare: new thoughts and controversies. Animal Sentience, 
5(11). 
Broom, D. M., 1998. Welfare, stress, and the evolution of feelings. Advances in the Study of Behavior, 
Volume 27, pp. 371-403. 
Broom, D. M., 2001a. Evolution of pain. Pain: its nature and management in man and animals, 
Volume 246, pp. 17-25. 
Broom, D. M., 2001c. Coping, stress and welfare. In: D. M. Broom, ed. Coping with Challenge: 
Welfare in Animals including Humans, proceedings if Dahlem conference. Berlin: Dahlem University 
Press, pp. 1-9. 
Broom, D. M., 2003. Causes of poor welfare in large animals during transport. Veterinary Research 
Communications, Volume 27, pp. 515-518. 
Broom, D. M., 2003. Science, ethics and public concern about animal welfare, Segovia: In Proceedings 
of the Fourth European Colloquium on Acute Phase Proteins.  
75 
 
Broom, D. M., 2008. Welfare assessment and relevant ethical decisions: key concepts. ARBS Annual 
Review of Biomedical Sciences, Volume 10, pp. 79-90. 
Broom, D. M., 2009. The roles of industry and science, including genetic selection, in improving 
animal welfare. Lucrari stiintifice Zootehnie si Biotehnologii Timisoara, Volume 42, pp. 532-546. 
Broom, D. M., 2016. Sentience and animal welfare: new thoughts and controversies. Animal 
Sentience, 5(11). 
Broom, D. M., Sena, H. & Moynihan, K. L., 2009. Pigs learn what a mirror image  represents and use it 
to obtain information. Animal Behaviour, Volume 78, pp. 1037-1041. 
Cabanac, M., 1979. Sensory pleasure. Quarterly Review of Biology, 54(1), pp. 1-29. 
Cabanac, M., Cabanac, A. J. & Parent, A., 2009. The emergence of consciousness in phylogeny. 
Behavioural Brain Research, Volume 198, pp. 267-272. 
Capucille, D. J., Poore, M. H. & Rogers, G. M., 2002. Castration in cattle: techniques and animal 
welfare issues. Compendium, Volume 24, pp. 66-73. 
Cargill, n.d. Our policy-animal welfare at Cargill and why it matters. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.cargill.com/meat-poultry/aw/animal-welfare-policy 
[Accessed 12 May 2017]. 
Carroll, J. A. et al., 2006. Hormonal profiles, behavioural responses, and short-term growth 
performance after castration of pigs at three, six, nine, or twelve days of age. Journal of Animal 
Science, Volume 84, pp. 1271-1278. 
Carroll, S. B., 2011. Endless forms most beautiful: the new science of evo devo and the making of the 
animal kingdom. 2nd ed. London: Quercus. 
CDC, 2013. Antibiotic resistance threats in the United States, 2013, s.l.: U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services. 
CIWF, Eurogroup for Animals, 2015. Report on the welfare of EU dairy cows, s.l.: s.n. 
CIWF, 2012. EU dairy farming investigations 2012. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ciwf.org.uk/our-campaigns/investigations/eu-dairy-farming-
investigations-2012/ 
[Accessed 24 January 2017]. 
CIWF, 2013. The life of: laying hens, s.l.: Comapssion in World Farming. 
CIWF, n.d(a). About chickens. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ciwf.org.uk/farm-animals/chickens/ 
[Accessed 20 May 2016]. 
CIWF, n.d(b). About dairy cows. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ciwf.org.uk/farm-animals/cows/dairy-cows/ 
[Accessed 20 May 2016]. 
CIWF, n.d(c). About calves reared for veal. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ciwf.org.uk/farm-animals/cows/veal-calves/ 
[Accessed 13 May 2017]. 
76 
 
CIWF, n.d(d). About pigs. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ciwf.org.uk/farm-animals/pigs 
[Accessed 26 January 2017]. 
CIWF, n.d(e). About dairy cows. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ciwf.com/farm-animals/cows/dairy-cows/ 
[Accessed 23 May 2017]. 
CIWF, n.d(e). Pig welfare. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ciwf.org.uk/farm-animals/pigs/pig-welfare/ 
[Accessed 14 May 2017]. 
CNRS, 2015. Mimicry helps sheep solve a dilemma. ScienceDaily, 2 October.  
Coghlan, A., 2009. Animals feel the pain of religious slaughter. New Scientist , 13 October.  
Conlee, K. M., Stephens, M. L., Rowan, A. N. & King, L. A., 2005. Carbon dioxide for euthanasia: 
concerns regarding pain and distress, with special reference to mice and rats. Laboratory Animals, 
Volume 39, pp. 137-161. 
Conrad, M. S., Dilger, R. N. & Johnson, R. W., 2012. Brain growth of the domestic pig (Sus scrofa) 
from 2 to 24 weeks of age: a longitudinal MRI study. Developmental Neuroscience, 34(4), pp. 291-
298. 
Conrad, M. S., Sutton, B. P., Dilger, R. N. & Johnson, R. W., 2014. An in vivo three -dimensional 
magnetic resonance imaging-based averaged brain collection of the neonatal piglet (Sus scrofa). 
PLoS ONE, 9(9). 
Conservation International, n.d. Forests. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.conservation.org/what/pages/forests.aspx 
[Accessed 18 May 2016]. 
Conservative Party, n.d. A new age of agriculture: our agenda for British farming, London: 
Conservative Party. 
Constable, H., 2017. Sheep are not stupid, and they are not helpless either. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20170418-sheep-are-not-stupid-and-they-are-not-
helpless-either?ocid=fbert 
[Accessed 20 May 2017]. 
Cornish, A., 2013. Chick talk: Do chickens have a language?. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.worldanimalprotection.us.org/news/chick-talk-do-chickens-have-
language 
[Accessed 20 May 2017]. 
Council of Europe, 1976. European convention for the protection of animals kept for farming 
purposes, Stasbourg: Council of Europe. 
Craggs, S., 2016. Pigs know their fate when they enter a slaughterhouse, expert says. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/hamilton/pigs-know-their-fate-when-they-enter-a-
slaughterhouse-expert-says-1.3829977 
[Accessed 6 February 2017]. 
77 
 
Cranley, J., 2017. Death and prolonged survival in non-stunned poultry: A case study. Journal of 
Veterinary Behavior, Volume 18, pp. 92-95. 
D’Silva, J. & Stevenson, P., 1995. Modern breeding technologies and the welfare of farm animals, s.l.: 
Compassion in World Farming Trust. 
Danbury, T. C. et al., 2000. Self-selection of the analgesic drug carprofen by lame broiler chickens. 
The Veterinary Record, 146(11), pp. 307-311. 
Darwiniana and Evolution, n.d. The Larus gulls circumpolar species ring; natural selection at work 
crafting new species. [Online]  
Available at: http://darwiniana.org/zimmergulls.htm 
[Accessed 23 May 2017]. 
Davies, M. & Humphreys, G. W., 1993. Consciousness. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Davis, H. & Taylor, A., 2001. Discrimination between individual humans by domestic fowl (Gallus 
gallus domesticus). British Poultry Science, Volume 42, pp. 276-279. 
Dawkins, M. S., 1993. Through our eyes only? The search for animal consciousness. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Dawkins, M. S., 1995. How do hens view other hens? The use of lateral and binocular visual fields in 
social recognition. Behaviour, 132(7/8), pp. 591-606. 
Dawkins, M. S., 2000. Animal minds and animal emotions. American Zoologist, 40(6), pp. 883-888. 
Dawkins, M. S., 2006. Through animal eyes: What behaviour tells us. Applied Animal Behaviour 
Science, 100(1). 
Dawkins, M. S., 2008. The science of animal suffering. Ethology, 114(10), pp. 937-945. 
Dawkins, M. S., 2012. Why animals matter: animal consciousness, animal welfare, and human well-
being. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dawkins, R., 1989. The selfish gene. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dawkins, R., 1993. Gaps in the mind. In: P. Cavalieri & P. Singer, eds. The Great Ape Project. New 
York: St. Martin's Griffin, pp. 81-87. 
Dawkins, R., 2004a. The ancestor’s tale: A pilgrimage to the dawn of life. London: Phoenix. 
Dawkins, R., 2004b. The salamander’s tale. In: The ancestor’s tale: A pilgrimage to the dawn of life. 
London: Phoenix, pp. XX-XX. 
Dawkins, R., 2011. Richard Dawkins: The tyranny of the discontinuos mind. New Statesman, 19 
December.  
Dawkins, R., 2014 . What scientific idea is ready for retirement? Essentialism. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.edge.org/response-detail/25366  
[Accessed 14 May 2017]. 
Department of Halal Certification, n.d. Why stunning Animals Prior to Slaughter cannot be accepted 
by Muslims?. [Online]  
Available at: http://halalcertification.ie/halal/why-stunning-is-not-accepted/ 
[Accessed 15 May 2017]. 
78 
 
DesJardins, J. R., n.d. Biocentrism. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/biocentrism#ref1191658 
[Accessed 23 May 2017]. 
Dubin, A. E. & Patapoutain, A., 2010. Nociceptors: the sensors of the pain pathway. The Journal of 
Clinical Investigation, Volume 120, pp. 3760-3772. 
Duncan, I. J. H., 2005. Science-based assessment of animal welfare: farm animals. Revue scientifique 
et technique, 24(2), pp. 483-492. 
Dunham, W., 2016. A gorilla named Susie illustrates genome similarities with humans. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-science-gorillas-idUSKCN0WX2UV 
[Accessed 8 February 2017]. 
Eicher, S. D., Cheng, H. W., Sorrells, A. D. & Schutz, M. M., 2006. Short communication: behavioral 
and physiological indicators of sensitivity or chronic pain following tail docking. Journal of Dairy 
Science, 89(8), pp. 3047-3051. 
Eisnitz, G. A., 2007. Slaughterhouse: The shocking story of greed, neglect, and inhumane treatment 
inside the U.S. meat industry. 2 ed. s.l.:Prometheus Books. 
Ekman, P., 1992. Are there basic emotions?. Psychological review, 99(3), pp. 550-553. 
Elliott, L., 2014. Researchers hope new tests will prevent an endemic in pork industry. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.k-state.edu/media/newsreleases/apr14/pigtests41414.html 
[Accessed 18 May 2017]. 




[Accessed 24 May 2017]. 
Explore beef, 2009. Modern beef production , s.l.: Cattlemen’s Beef Board and National Cattlemen’s 
Beef Association. 
FAO, n.d(a). SAVE FOOD: Global Initiative on Food Loss and Waste Reduction: Key Findings. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.fao.org/save-food/resources/keyfindings/en/ 
[Accessed 19 May 2016]. 
FAO, n.d(b). Techniques and hygiene practices in slaughtering and meat handling. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/T0279E/T0279E04.htm 
[Accessed 15 May 2017]. 
Farouk, M. M., 2013. Advances in the industrial production of halal and kosher red meat. Meat 
Science, Volume 95, pp. 805-820. 
Ferguson, D. M. & Warner, R. D., 2008. Have we underestimated the impact of pre -slaughter stress 
on meat quality in ruminants?. Meat Science, 80(1), pp. 12-19. 
Fields, H., Millstine, D., Agrwal, N. & Marks, L., 2016. Is meat killing us?. The Journal of the American 
Osteopathic Association, Volume 116, pp. 296-300. 
79 
 
Food Empowerment Project, n.d. Factory farm workers. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.foodispower.org/factory-farm-workers/ 
[Accessed 25 May 2017]. 
Fraser, D., 2005. Animal welfare and the intensification of animal production: an alternative 
interpretation, Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
Fredriksen, B. et al., 2009. Practice on castration of piglets in europe. Animal, 3(11), pp. 1480-1487. 
Friel, M. et al., 2016. Acoustic signalling reflects personality in a social mammal. Royal Society journal 
Open Science. 
Galtung, J., 1969. Violence, peace, and peace research. Journal of Peace Research, Volume 6, pp. 
167-191. 
Galtung, J., 1996. Peace by peaceful means: peace and conflict, development and civilization. 
London: Sage. 
Gannon, M., 2016. Race is a social construct, scientists argue. Live Science, 4 February.  
Garner, R., 2005. Introduction. In: Animal ethics. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 1-13. 
Gentle, M. J., 2011. Pain issues in poultry. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, Volume 135, pp. 252-
258. 
Gentle, M. J., Hughes, B. O., Fox, A. & Waddington, D., 1997. Behavioural and anatomical 
consequences of two beak trimming methods in 1‐ and 10‐d‐old domestic chicks. British Poultry 
Science, 38(5), pp. 453-463. 
Gentle, M. J., Hughes, B. O. & Hubrecht, R. C., 1982. The effect of beak trimming on food intake, 
feeding behaviour and body weight in adult hens. Applied Animal Ethology, Volume 8, pp. 147-159. 
Gentle, M. J., Waddington, D., Hunter, L. N. & Jones, R. B., 1990. Behavioural evidence for persistent 
pain following partial beak amputation in chickens. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, Volume 27, 
pp. 149-157. 
Gerrig, R. J. & Zimbardo, P. G., 2002. Glossary of psychological terms. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.apa.org/research/action/glossary.aspx?tab=3 
[Accessed 19 May 2017]. 
Gibson, T. J. et al., 2009. Electroencephalographic responses of halothane - anaesthetised calves to 
slaughter by ventral-neck incision without prior stunning. New Zealand Veterinary Journal, 57(2), pp. 
77-83. 
Glatz, P. C., 2000. Review of beak-trimming methods, s.l.: Rural Indusrties Research and 
Development Corporation. 
Goodland, R. & Anhang, J., 2009. Livestock and climate change: What is the key actors in climate 
change are…cows, pigs and chickens?. World Watch Magazine, November/December, pp. 10-19. 
Grandin, T. & Regenstein, J. M., 1994. Religious slaughter and animal welfare: A discussion for meat 
scientists. Meat Focus International, pp. 115-123. 





[Accessed 24 November 2016]. 
Greger, M., 2010. Trait selection and welfare of genetically engineered animals in agriculture. 
Journal of Animal Science, 88(2), pp. 811-814. 
Gregory, N. G., 1986. The physiology of electrical stunning and slaughter. Hertfordshire, UFAW, 
Humane Slaughter of Animals for Food Symposium. 
Gregory, N. G., Feilding, H. R., von Wenzlawowicz, M. & von Holleben, K., 2010. Time to collapse 
following slaughter without stunning in cattle. Meat Science, Volume 85, pp. 66-69. 
Gregory, N. G. et al., 2012. Complications during shechita and halal slaughter without stunning in 
cattle. Animal Welfare, Volume 21, pp. 81-86. 
Grichkin, K. P. & Ferrante, F. M., 1991. The difference between acute and chronic pain. The Mount 
Sinai Journal of Medicine, Volume 58, pp. 217-220. 
Gurian-Sherman, D., 2008. CAFOs uncovered: the untold cost of confined animal feeding operations, 
Cambridge: Union of Conerned Scientists. 
Harari, Y. N., 2011. Sapiens: a brief history of humankind. London: Vintage. 
Harari, Y. N., 2015. Industrial farming is one of the worst crimes in history. The Guardian, 25 
September.  
Harrison, R., 1964. Animal Machines. Oxfordshire: CABI. 
Harris, S., 2010a. Science can answer moral questions. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ted.com/talks/sam_harris_science_can_show_what_s_right 
[Accessed 16 November 2016]. 
Harris, S., 2010b. The moral landscape: how science can determine human values. New York: Simon 
& Schuster. 
Hartung, J., Nowak, B., Waldmann, K. H. & Ellerbrock, S., 2002. CO2 stunning of s laughter pigs: 
Effects on EEG, catecholamines and clinical reflexes. Deutsche tierärztliche Wochenschrift, 109(3), 
pp. 135-139. 
Hayhow, D. et al., 2016. State of nature 2016, s.l.: State of Nature partnership. 
Hay, M. et al., 2003. Assessment of pain induced by castration in piglets: behavioral and 
physiological responses over the subsequent 5 days. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, Volume 82, 
pp. 201-218. 
Hill, J. L., 1996. The arguement from the rights and interests of animals. In: The case for 
vegetarianism; philosophy for a small planet. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 31-67. 
Holt-Giménez, E. et al., 2012. We already grow enough food for 10 billion people … and still can't 
end hunger. Journal of Sustainable Agriculture, Volume 36, p. 595–598. 
Hooper, R., 2011. Death in dolphins: do they understand they are mortal?. New Scientist, 31 August.  
Horrigan, L., Graham, J. & McKenzie, S., 2010. Antibiotic drug abuse CAFOs are squandering vital 
human medicines. In: D. Imhoff, ed. The CAFO reader: The tragedy of industrial animal factories. 
California: Watershed Media, pp. 254-261. 
81 
 
HSUS, 2009. An HSUS report: The welfare of sows used for breeding in the pig industry, s.l.: The 
Humane Socirty of the United States. 
HSUS, 2012a. An HSUS report: the welfare of animals in the veal industry, s.l.: The Humane Society of 
the United States. 
HSUS, 2012b. An HSUS report: The welfare of calves in the beef industry, s.l.: Humane Society 
Institute for Science and Policy. 
HSUS, 2012c. An HSUS report: welfare issues with tail docking of cows in the dairy industry, s.l.: 
Humane Society Institute for Science and Policy. 
HSUS, n.d. An HSUS Report: Welfare Issues with Selective Breeding of Egg-Laying Hens for 
Productivity, s.l.: The Humane society of the United States. 
Hutchinson, B., 2014. Canada’s largest dairy farm crippled by abuse allegations from undercover 
animal rights worker on his first mission. National Post, 20 June.  
Imhoff, D., 2010. The CAFO reader: the tragedy of industrial animal factories. s.l.:The Foundation for 
Deep Ecology. 
IPCC, 2014. Climate change 2014: mitigation of climate change. Contribution of working group III to 
the fifth assessment, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Jackson, M., 2016. Ravens might possess a Theory of Mind, say scientists. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/Science/2016/0202/Ravens-might-possess-a-Theory-of-
Mind-say-scientists 
[Accessed 19 May 2017]. 
Jendral, M. J. & Robinson, F. E., 2004. Beak trimming in chickens: historical, economical, 
physiological and welfare implications, and alternatives for preventing feather pecking and 
cannibalistic activity. Avian and Poultry Biology Reviews, 15(1), pp. 9-23. 
Jensen, T. S., Krebs, B., Nielsen, J. & Rasmussen, P., 1983. Phantom limb, phantom pain and stump 
pain in amputees during the first six months following limb amputation. Pain, Volume 17, pp. 243-
256. 
Johnson, R., 2014. Rationalism and animal ethics. [Online]  
Available at: https://robertjohnson.org.uk/2014/02/17/rationalism-and-animal-ethics/ 
[Accessed 29 May 2016]. 
Joy, M., 2010. Why we love dogs, eat pigs, and wear cows: an introduction to carnism. San Francisco: 
Conari Press. 
Kalof, L. & Fitzgerald, A., 2007. The animals reader: the essential classic and contemporary writings. 
Oxford: Berg. 
Kansas State University, 2014. Patent issued for research related to alleviating pain in cattle. 
ScienceDaily, 27 August.  
Keshavarz, K., 1990. Causes of prolapse in laying flocks. Poultry Digest, September, p. 42. 
King, B. J., 2016. Animal mourning. Animal Sentience, Volume 4. 
82 
 
Kuenzel, W. J., 2007. Neurobiological basis of sensory perception: welfare implications of beak 
trimming. Poultry Science, 86(6), pp. 1273-1282. 
Kwa, A., 2001. Agriculture in developing countries: which way forward?. [Online]  
Available at: https://focusweb.org/publications/2001/agriculture_which_way_forward.html  
[Accessed 24 May 2017]. 
Lameira, A. R. et al., 2016. Vocal fold control beyond the species-specific repertoire in an orang-utan. 
Scientific Reports, 6(30315). 
Lay Jr., D. C. et al., 2011. Hen welfare in different housing systems. Poultry Science, 90(1), pp. 278-
294. 
Leathers, H. D. & Foster, P., 2009. The world food problem: toward ending undernutrition in the third 
world. 4th ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Leidig, M. S. et al., 2009. Pain and discomfort in male piglets during surgical castration with and 
without local anaesthesia as determined by vocalisation and defence behaviour. Applied Animal 
Science Behaviour, Volume 116, pp. 174-178. 
Linzey, A., 2008. On “Not Doing” Animals. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.oxfordanimalethics.com/what-we-do/commentary/on-not-doing-animals/ 
[Accessed 23 May 2017]. 
Lipinski, B. et al., 2013. Reducing food loss and waste. Instalment 2 in Creating a sustainable food 
future, Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. 
Low, P., 2012. The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness. Cambridge: s.n. 
Lürzel, S. et al., 2015. The influence of gentle interactions on avoidance distance towards humans, 
weight gain and physiological parameters in group-housed dairy calves. Applied Animal Behaviour 
Science, Volume 172, pp. 9-16. 
Lymbery, P. & Oakeshott, I., 2014a. Farmageddon: The true cost of cheap meat. London: 
Bloomsbury. 
Lymbery, P. & Oakeshott, I., 2014b. California girls: a vision of the future?. In: Farmageddon: The 
true cost of cheap meat. London: Bloomsbury, pp. 11-26. 
Marchant-Forde, J. N. et al., 2009. Postnatal piglet husbandry practices and well -being: the effects of 
alternative techniques delivered separately. Journal of Animal Science, Volume 87, pp. 1479-1492. 
Marshall, A., 2013. Talk it over: language, uniquely, makes us human. [Online]  
Available at: http://theconversation.com/talk-it-over-language-uniquely-makes-us-human-12242 
[Accessed 26 May 2017]. 
Martin, B., 2014. The uncounted dead: farming's unofficial victims, Kent: Animal Aid. 
Martinho III, A. & Kacelnik, A., 2016. Ducklings imprint on the relational concept of ''same or 
different". Science, 353(6296), pp. 286-288. 
Martinho, A., 2106. The minds of other animals. [Online]  
Available at: https://aeon.co/essays/why-wont-biologists-say-that-animals-might-be-conscious 
[Accessed 21 May 2017]. 
83 
 
Martz, E., 1997. Pigs can play video games. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.all-creatures.org/articles/ar-pigscanplay.html 
[Accessed 25 May 2017]. 
Mason, J. W., 1974. Specificity in the organization of neuroendocrine response profiles. In: P. 
Seemans & G. Brown, eds. Frontiers in Neurology and Neuroscience Research. Toronto: University of 
Toronto, pp. 68-80. 
Mason, R., 2016. Government planning to repeal animal welfare codes. The Guardian [online], 25 
March. 
Matheny, G., 2006. Utilitarianism and animals. In: In defense of animals: the second wave. Oxford: 
Blackwell, pp. 13-25. 
Matthews, L. & Ladewig, J., 1987. Stimulus requirements of housed pigs assessed by behavioural 
demand functions. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, Volume 17, p. 369. 
McCormick Donaldson, T., n.d. Is boredom driving pigs crazy?. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.webpages.uidaho.edu/range556/Appl_BEHAVE/projects/pigs_ster.html  
[Accessed 18 May 2017]. 
Michaëlsson, K. et al., 2014. Milk intake and risk of mortality and fractures in women and men: 
cohort studies. BJM, Volume 349. 
Molony, V., Kent, J. E. & Robertson, I. S., 1995. Assessment of acute and chronic pain after different 
methods of castration of calves. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, Volume 46, pp. 33-48. 
Monbiot, G., 2013. Feral: searching for enchantment on the frontiers of rewilding. London: Penguin. 
Moya, S. L., Boyle, L. A., Lynch, P. A. & Arkins, S., 2008. Effect of surgical castration on the 
behavioural and acute phase responses of 5-day-old piglets. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 
Volume 111, pp. 133-145. 
Nakamura, T. et al., 2016. Digits and fin rays share common developmental histories. Nature, 
Volume 537, pp. 225-228. 
Nakyinsige, K. et al., 2013. Stunning and animal welfare from Islamic and scientific perspectives. 
Meat Science, Volume 95, pp. 352-361. 
Nathan, C., 2004. Antibiotics at the crossroads. Nature, Volume 431, pp. 899-902. 
National Research Council (US), 2009. Recognition and alleviation of pain in laboratory animals, 
Washington (DC): National Academies Press. 
NCBI, 2002. Animal biotechnology: Science-based concerns, Washington, DC: National Academics 
Press. 
Noonan, G. J. et al., 1994. Behavioural observations of piglets undergoing tail docking, teeth clipping 
and ear notching. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, Volume 39, pp. 203-213. 
Oltenacu, P. A. & Broom, D. M., 2010. The impact of genetic selection for increased milk yield on the 
welfare of dairy cows. Animal Welfare, Volume 19, pp. 39-49. 
84 
 
Padilla de la Torrea, M., Briefer, E. F., Reader, T. & McElligott, A. G., 2015. Acoustic analysis of cattle 
(Bos taurus) mother–offspring contact calls from a source–filter theory perspective. Applied Animal 
Behaviour Science, Volume 163, pp. 58-68. 
Pan, A. et al., 2012. Red meat consumption and mortality; results from 2 prospective cohort studies. 
Archive of Internal Medicine, Volume 172, pp. 555-563. 
Panksepp, J., 2005. Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 14(1), pp. 30-80. 
Pickett, H., Crossley, D. & Sutton, C., 2014. Farm Animal Welfare past, present and future, s.l.: 
Freedom Food. 
Pinker, S., 2011. The better angels of our nature: why violence has declined.. New York: Penguin. 
Povinelli, D. J. & Giambrone, S., 1999. Inferring other minds: failure of the argument by analogy. 
Philosophical Topics, 27(1), p. 167. 
Purvis, A., 2005. It's supposed to be lean cuisine. So why is this chicken fatter than it looks?. The 
Observer, 15 May.  
Raj, A. B. M., 2006. Recent developments in stunning and slaughter of poultry. World's Poultry 
Science Journal, Volume 62, pp. 467-484. 
Raj, M., 2010. Stunning and Slaughter. In: I. J. H. Duncan & P. Hawkins, eds. The welfare of domestic 
fowl and other captive bird. s.l.:Springer, pp. 259-277. 
Rault, J., Lay, D. C. & Marchant-Forde, J. N., 2011. Castration induced pain in pigs and other livestock. 
Applied Animal Behaviour Science, Volume 135, pp. 214-225. 
Riddell, C., 1992. Non-infectious skeletal disorders of poultry: an overview. In: C. C. Whitehead, ed. 
Bone Biology and Skeletal Disorders in Poultry. Oxfordshire: Carfax Publishing Company, pp. 119-45. 
Ridley, M., 2004a. The rise of evolutionary biology. In: Evolution. Malden: Blackwell Science Ltd, pp. 
3-20. 
Ridley, M., 2004b. The evidence for evolution. In: Evolution. Malden: Blackwell Science Ltd, pp. 43-
70. 
Robertson, T. & Atkins, P., 2016. Essential vs. Accidental Properties. [Online]  
Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/essential-accidental/ 
[Accessed 14 May 2017]. 
Robinson, C., Bowles, D. & Avizienius, J., 2015a. Long distance live transport and the transport of 
animals to the continent, s.l.: RSPCA. 
Robinson, C., Bowles, D. & Avizienius, J., 2015b. Slaughter of farm animals, s.l.: RSPCA. 
Rodd, R., 1990. Biology, ethics and animals. Oxford: Clarenden Press. 
RSPCA, 2016. What happens with male chicks in the egg industry?. [Online]  
Available at: http://kb.rspca.org.au/What-happens-with-male-chicks-in-the-egg-industry_100.html 
[Accessed 17 May 2017]. 
85 
 
RSPCA, n.d(a). Farming meat chickens. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.rspca.org.uk/adviceandwelfare/farm/meatchickens/farming 
[Accessed 20 May 2016]. 
RSPCA, n.d(b). Dairy cattle - key welfare issues. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.rspca.org.uk/adviceandwelfare/farm/dairy/keyissues 
[Accessed 25 January 2017]. 
RSPCA, n.d(c). Pigs - key welfare issues. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.rspca.org.uk/adviceandwelfare/farm/pigs/keyissues 
[Accessed 26 January 2017]. 
Rutkin, A., 2016. Almost human?. New Scientist, 2 July, pp. 16-17. 
Ryder, R., 1991. Sentientism. The Psychologist, Volume 4, p. 201. 
Safina, C., 2015. Beyond words: what animals think and feel. New York: Holt. 
Sandilands, V., Sparks, N., Wilson, S. & Nevison, I., 2005. Laying hens at depopulation: the impact of 
the production system on bird welfare. British Poultry, Volume 1, pp. 23-24. 
Seth, A. K., Baars, B. J. & Edelman, D. B., 2005. Criteria for consciousness in humans and other 
mammals. Consciousness and Cognition, Volume 14, pp. 119-139. 
Shields, S. & Duncan, I. J. H., 2009. An HSUS report: A comparison of the welfare of hens in battery 
cages and alternative systems, s.l.: The Humane Society of the United States. 
Shreeve, J., 2015. This Face Changes the Human Story. But How?. [Online]  
Available at: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/09/150910-human-evolution-change/ 
[Accessed 14 May 2017]. 
Siegle, L., 2014. Have vets really sold out to industrial agri -business?. The Guardian, 20 January.  
Singer, P., 1975. Animal liberation. 2nd ed. London: Jonathan Cape. 
Singer, P. & Posner, R., 2001. Animal rights: a debate between Peter Singer and Richard Posner. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.utilitarian.net/singer/interviews-debates/200106--.htm 
[Accessed 17 October 2016]. 
Society for Endocrinology, n.d. Cortisol. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.yourhormones.info/Hormones/Cortisol.aspx 
[Accessed 24 May 2017]. 
Song, M. et al., 2016. Association of animal and plant protein intake with all-cause and cause-specific 
mortality. JAMA Internal Medicine, 176(10), pp. 1453-1463. 
Spencer, G. & Westerhouse, J., 2004. Researchers compare chicken, human genomes: analysis of first 
avian genome uncovers differences between birds and mammals. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.genome.gov/12514316 
[Accessed 8 February 2017]. 




Stephan, C., Wilkinson, A. & Huber, L., 2012. Have we met before? Pigeons recognise famil iar human 
faces. Avian Biology Research, 5(2), p. 75. 
Stevenson, A., 2010. Slaughter. In: Oxford Dictionary of English. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Stull, C. L., Payne, M. A., Berry, S. L. & Hullinge, P. J., 2002. Evaluation of the scientific justification for 
tail docking in dairy cattle. JAVMA, 220(9), pp. 1298-1303. 
Sutherland, M. A., Bryer, P. J., Krebs, N. & McGlone, J. J., 2008. Tail docking in pigs: acute 
physiological and behavioural responses. Animal, Volume 2, pp. 292-297. 
Sutherland, M. A. & Tucker, C. B., 2011. The long and short of it: A review of tail docking in farm 
animals. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, Volume 135, pp. 179-191. 
Suzuki, R., Buck, J. R. & Tyack, P. L., 2006. Information entropy of humpback whale songs. The 
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 119(3), pp. 1849-1866. 
Taylor, A. A. & Weary, D. M., 2000. Vocal responses of piglets to castration: identifying procedural 
sources of pain. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, Volume 70, pp. 17-26. 
Terlouw, C., 2005. Stress reactions at slaughter and meat quality in pigs: genetic background and 
prior experience: a brief review of recent findings: product quality and livestock systems. Livestock 
Production Science, Volume 94, pp. 125-135. 
Terlouw, E. M. C. et al., 2008. Pre-slaughter conditons, animal stress and welfare: Current status and 
possible future research. Animal, 2(10), pp. 1501-1517. 
Terlouw, E. M. C., Bourguet, C. & Deiss, V., 2012. Stress at slaughter in cattle: role of reactivity profile 
and environmental factors. Animal Welfare, Volume 21, pp. 43-49. 
Thomson, D. U. et al., 2015. Description of a novel fatigue syndrome of finished feedlot cattle 
following transportation. Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association, 247(1), pp. 66-72. 
Tom, E. M. et al., 2002. Effects of tail docking using a rubber ring with or without anesthetic on 
behavior and production of lactating cows. Journal of Dairy Science, 85(9), pp. 2257-2265. 
Troeger, K., Moje, M. & Schurr, B., 2005. Kontrolle der entblutung. Voraussetzung fur eine 
tiersschutzkonforme Schweineschlachtung. Fleischwirtschaft, Volume 85, pp. 107-110. 
Tyler, A., 2011. The trouble with animal farming, Kent: Animal Aid. 
Tyson Foods, inc., 2015. Animal well-being, s.l.: Tyson Foods, inc.. 
United Nations, n.d. Sustainable development goals: 17 goals to transform our world. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/ 
[Accessed 1 June 2017]. 
University of Illinois College of Agricultural, Consumer and Environmental Sciences , 2012. Piglets in 
mazes provide insights into human cognitive development. ScienceDaily, 25 July.  
USDA, 1978. Humane Methods of Slaughter Act. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.nal.usda.gov/awic/humane-methods-slaughter-act 
[Accessed 23 May 2017]. 
87 
 
van Leeuwen, E. J. C., Mulenga, I. C., Bodamer, M. D. & Cronin, K. A., 2016. Chimpanzees' responses 
to the dead body of a 9-year-old group member. American Journal of Primatology, 78(9), pp. 914-
922. 
Viegas, J., 2013. First love child of human, Neanderthal found. Live Science, 28 March.  
von Borell, E. et al., 2009. Animal welfare implications of surgical castration and its alternatives in 
pigs. Animal, 3(11), pp. 1488-1496. 
von Keyserlingk, M. A. G., Rushen, J., de Passillé, A. M. & Weary, D., 2009. The welfare of dairy cattle: 
key concepts and the role of science. Journal of Dairy Science, Volume 92, p. 4101–4111. 
Warnick, L. D., Janssen, D., Guard, C. L. & Gröhn, Y. T., 2001. The effect of lameness on milk 
production in dairy cows. Journal of Dairy Science, 84(9), pp. 1988-1997. 
Warrick, J., 2001. 'They die piece by piece'. The Washington Post, 10 April.  
Wascher, C. A. F., Szipl, G., Boeckle, M. & Wilkinson, A., 2012. You sound familiar: carrion crows can 
differentiate between the calls of known and unknown heterospecifics. Animal Cognition, Volume 
15, p. 1015. 
Weary, D. M., Niel, L., Flower, F. C. & Fraser, D., 2006. Identifying and preventing pain in animals. 
Applied Animal Behaviour Science, Volume 100, pp. 64-76. 
Widowski, T. M. & Duncan, I. J. H., 2000. Working for a dustbath: are  hens increasing pleasure rather 
than reducing suffering?. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 68(1), pp. 39-53. 
Wilson, S. D., n.d. Animals and ethics. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/ 
[Accessed 3 May 2016]. 
World Health Organisation, 1993. ICD-10, the ICD-10 classification of mental and behavioural 
disorders: diagnostic criteria for research. Geneva: World Health Organisation. 
WWF, n.d. Forest habitat. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.worldwildlife.org/habitats/forest-habitat 
[Accessed 19 May 2016]. 
Yokoyama, Y. et al., 2014. Vegetarian diets and blood pressure: a meta-analysis. JAMA Internal 
Medicine, Volume 174, pp. 577-587. 
Yudell, M., Roberts, D., DeSalle, R. & Tishkoff, S., 2016. Taking race out of human genetics. Science, 
Volume 351, pp. 564-565. 
Zimmer, C., 2016. Scientists unveil new ‘Tree of Life’. [Online]  
Available at: https://richarddawkins.net/2016/04/scientists-unveil-new-tree-of-life/ 
[Accessed 8 February 2017]. 
Zivotofsky, A. Z. & Strous, R. D., 2012. A perspective on the electrical stunning of animals: Are there 
lessons to be learned from human electro-convulsive therapy. Meat Science, Volume 90, pp. 956-
961. 
 
 
